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ABSTRACT 
Presidential approval ratings are a political resource that presidents and their advisors hope to 
influence through strategic action in order to achieve their policy goals (McAvoy 2008, 284). 
Through 1999, scholarly literature had largely ignored the president’s use of unilateral powers. 
Since Moe and Howell (1999a, 1999b), however, the literature on the unilateral presidency has 
expanded rapidly. Despite the rapid growth of literature examining the unilateral presidency, and 
45 years of presidential approval ratings literature, literature examining the link between the 
president’s use of unilateral powers and subsequent presidential approval ratings is virtually 
nonexistent. Existing research has not statistically examined what effect, if any, the president’s 
issuing executive orders has on subsequent job approval ratings. This thesis seeks to address that 
research gap. By modeling aggregate and individual-level presidential approval ratings, using 
fixed-effect models, OLS regression, and binary logistic regression, this thesis finds evidence 
indicating the president’s issuing of executive orders has a negative impact on the subsequent 
presidential job approval ratings that individuals report. If an executive order is salient to the 
public, presidents receive lower presidential approval ratings from persons of all political parties; 
however, if the executive order is non-salient then presidents only receive lower presidential 
approval ratings from members of their own political party. Members of the opposition party 
report higher presidential approval ratings when the president issued non-salient executive 
orders. Thus, this thesis concludes that the president’s issuing of executive orders has significant 
effects on subsequent presidential job approval ratings, and future research should be conducted 
to explore this relationship further.     
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“And that’s why, today, I’m beginning a new effort to fix as much of our immigration 
system as I can on my own, without Congress.” 
 
“I have also directed Secretary Johnson and Attorney General Holder to identify 
additional actions my administration can take on our own, within my existing legal 
authorities, to do what Congress refuses to do and fix as much of our immigration system 
as we can.” 
President Barack Obama, June 30, 2014 (Office of the Press Secretary 2014). 
Frustrated with a deadlocked Congress on immigration reform, and fearing the further growth of 
an ever-deepening humanitarian crisis on the border, President Obama decided to act unilaterally 
to do what Congress could not or would not do. President Obama is only one of many presidents 
who have increasingly decided to act unilaterally after facing a hostile or deadlocked Congress. 
Increasingly presidents have used executive orders to obtain their national or foreign policy goals 
(Moe and Howell 1999a, 1999b). By using executive orders to circumvent Congress, presidents 
are able to use only one of their many tools to act unilaterally.1  
Through 1999, scholarly literature had largely ignored the use of unilateral powers by 
presidents. Since Moe and Howell (1999a, 1999b); however, the literature on the unilateral 
presidency has expanded rapidly. Despite the rapid growth of the literature examining the 
unilateral presidency, and 45 years of presidential approval ratings literature; literature 
examining the link between the president’s use of unilateral powers and subsequent presidential 
approval ratings is virtually nonexistent. Existing research has not statistically examined what 
effect, if any, issuing executive orders have on a president’s approval ratings. Some studies 
                                                 
1 Other tools include executive agreements, proclamations, national security directives, 
memoranda, and signing statements (Howell 2005). 
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suggest an implicit negative relationship between presidential approval ratings and executive 
orders (see Mayer and Price 2002; Ouyang 2012). This thesis proposes a theory and a set of 
hypotheses, tested at the aggregate and individual-level, positing a negative relationship between 
the number of executive orders that a president issues and their subsequent presidential job 
approval ratings.  
The next section of this chapter is a discussion of the central theory and hypotheses of 
this thesis. This chapter then concludes with two sections discussing some of the important 
expected findings of this thesis. 
1.1 Theory and Hypotheses 
As previously discussed, literature studying the relationship between executive orders 
and presidential approval is not extensive, and studies examining the effect executive orders has 
on presidential approval ratings (if any) are non-existent. Ouyang (2012) reports presidents are 
constrained in the number of executive orders that they can issue because of diffuse support 
approval ratings at an aggregate level; they fear issuing too many executive orders may lower 
diffuse support presidential approval ratings. Although Ouyang (2012) does not discuss why 
presidents fear issuing too many executive orders and how this lowers diffuse support 
presidential approval ratings, I theorize this is the case because a majority of the public does not, 
generally, approve of the president’s acting unilaterally in the form of executive orders and 
issuing executive orders may lower presidential approval ratings in the aggregate. Members of 
the public may disapprove of the use of executive orders because executive orders often bypass 
3 
 
Congress (Howell 2005), or members of the public may disapprove of the president’s acting 
unilaterally for ideological differences (discussed more below).  
Ouyang (2012) argues presidents constrain themselves because the use of executive 
orders may lower the level of diffuse support the institution currently enjoys by negatively 
affecting the president’s “image” in the public’s view, and, during times of high diffuse support, 
presidents would not want to do this (Ouyang 2012, 11). There is a strong link between 
presidential job approval ratings and a president’s “image” (McAvoy 2008). McAvoy (2008) 
reports that Gallup’s presidential approval question is unable to differentiate between “image” or 
“surface” and “substance” or “depth,” and, therefore, anything that affects a president’s image 
also affects their presidential job approval ratings (McAvoy 2008, 296).2 If the president’s image 
is lowered because the public reacts negatively to the use of unilateral powers by the president in 
the form of issuing executive orders, as I theorize, then presidential approval ratings may also act 
accordingly. 
Reeves and Rogowski (2016a), using five national representative surveys conducted 
between 2013 and 2015, report that public support for direct unilateral power use, through 
executive orders, is low but conditioned by context (148). The public generally disapproves of 
direct unilateral action; however, if the president acts unilaterally for the sake of national security 
or because Congress is in a state of gridlock approval for unilateral power use increases by 20 
percentage points (Reeves and Rogowski 2016a, 148). Reeves and Rogowski’s (2016a) findings 
are consistent with my theory and hypothesis in that the public disapproves of the president 
                                                 
2 Gallup presidential job approval question asks: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way [first 
and last name] is handling his job as President?”  
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acting unilaterally. In general, the public demonstrates low levels of approval for unilateral 
actions (including executive orders); accordingly, executive orders should be negatively 
associated with presidential job approval ratings. If the public generally disapproves of unilateral 
power use (including issuing executive orders) by the president as Reeves and Rogowski (2016a) 
report, and my theory and hypotheses posit, then issuing executive orders may have a negative 
impact on presidential job approval ratings. 
As discussed previously, I theorize the majority of the public, in general, disapproves of 
the president’s acting unilaterally by issuing executive orders. Because of this, I hypothesize: 
H1: There is a negative relationship between the number of executive orders that a 
president issues and subsequent presidential job approval ratings, ceteris paribus. 
Ouyang (2012) also discusses the relative saliency of executive orders and how non-salient and 
salient executive orders have different effects on diffuse support approval ratings. Using a 
dataset on significant executive orders (collected by Howell 2003, 2005), Ouyang (2012) 
considers an executive order salient when it is non-ceremonial3 and featured on the front page of 
The New York Times. 4 Because not all executive orders may be salient to the public, I 
hypothesize: 
                                                 
3 As Howell (2005) notes, sometimes executive orders appear on the front page of The New York 
Times that do not include any policy content. These “ceremonial” executive orders are not 
included among the data analyzed in this study. Only executive orders that include policy 
content are analyzed presently. 
4 As Howell (2005) notes, virtually all page one stories carry over to other sections of the paper. 
Therefore, as long as the article discussing the executive order begins on the front page, it is 
defined as a salient executive order. Howell (2005) divides these salient executive orders into 
mentions of executive orders in the first 10 paragraphs only (the front page only), and mentions 
of executive orders that started on the front page. For the purpose of this paper, I consider an 
executive order as salient as long as the article began on the front page. 
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H2: Salient executive orders will have a greater negative effect on presidential job 
approval ratings than will non-salient executive orders, ceteris paribus. 
Bond and Fleisher (2001), and Lebo and Cassino (2007) find evidence indicating partisan 
identity has a large effect on presidential job approval ratings. Respondents belonging to the 
same party affiliation as the president approve of the president’s job performance more than 
respondents belonging to different party affiliations. I hypothesize: 
H3: The negative relationship between the numbers of executive orders that a president 
issues and subsequent presidential job approval ratings holds for respondents belonging 
to all party affiliations, ceteris paribus; however, this negative relationship is less strong 
for persons belonging to the same political party as the president than is negative 
relationship for persons belonging to some other party, ceteris paribus. 
If my theory that the majority of the public, in general, disapproves of the president’s acting 
unilaterally in the form of issuing executive orders is empirically supported, then I expect to find 
evidence indicating support for Hypothesis 3. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are tested in Chapters 3 and 4 
on aggregate- and individual-level models. Hypothesis 3 can only be tested in Chapter 4 at an 
individual-level due to data constraints that are discussed in Chapter 3. The next two sections of 
this chapter discusses expected findings for each section. 
1.2 Aggregate-Level Model Expected Findings 
Presidential job approval ratings are largely a function of previous presidential job 
approval ratings (Hibbs 1977; Nicholson, Segura, and Woods 2002; Burden and Mughan 2003; 
Geys and Vermeir 2008; Newman and Forcehimes 2010; Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair 2013). 
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Therefore, because presidential job approval ratings in one month are largely a function of 
previous monthly approval ratings, I expect to find previous presidential approval ratings will 
largely impact current presidential approval ratings. I expect to find previously low approval 
ratings are related to low current approval ratings, and previously high approval ratings are 
related to higher current approval ratings (Expected Finding 3.1 [EF 3.1]). This is, thus, likely 
some sort of autoregressive function describing the relationship here between past and present 
levels of presidential job approval. 
Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair (2013) tells us that the national economy, and specifically 
the stock market, are valid indicators of the economic well-being of the country at an aggregate-
level. They find that the president is rewarded, in the form of higher presidential approval 
ratings, when the national economy is performing well; when the economy is performing poorly, 
the president is punished in the form of comparatively lower presidential approval ratings. 
Therefore, I expect to find evidence indicating presidential approval ratings are significantly 
associated with changes in the stock market. Increases in the stock market will be related to 
higher presidential job approval ratings, and decreases in stock market indices should be related 
to lower presidential job approval ratings (EF 3.2).  
Presidents are more able to credibly pass blame to other political actors more during 
times of divided government than they are during times of unified government (Nicholson, 
Segura, and Woods 2002). Because of this, I expect to find that during times of divided 
government, presidential job approval ratings will be comparatively higher than such ratings 
during times of unified government (EF 3.3). Jones (2014), and nearly every presidential 
approval rating study since Mueller (1970, 1973), have reported presidents receive higher 
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approval ratings during their first six months in office (honeymoon period). Therefore, I expect 
to find evidence indicating presidents observe significantly higher approval ratings during their 
first six months in office than they do during the rest of their time in office (EF 3.4). Thus, the 
issuance of executive orders during the “honeymoon period" should have a lesser statistically 
significant and negative effect on presidential approval ratings during this period, than issuing 
executive orders would have outside of the “honeymoon period”. 
1.3 Individual-Level Model Expected Findings 
As previously discussed, Bond and Fleisher (2001), and Lebo and Cassino (2007) find 
evidence indicating partisan identity has a large effect on presidential job approval ratings. 
Individuals belonging to the same political party of the president approve of the president’s job 
performance at higher levels comparatively than respondents belonging to different political 
parties. Therefore, I expect to find (Expected Finding 4.1 [EF 4.1]) that in comparing 
individuals, those who belong to the same political party as the president will be more likely to 
approve of the president than will those individuals who belong to a different political party than 
the president (Bond and Fleisher 2001; Lebo and Cassino 2007). 
Brody (1991) notes that aggregate-level studies of presidential approval ratings often 
“assume that individuals: (1) receive evidence about the performance of the economy, (2) judge 
this evidence against some benchmark, and (3) blame or credit the president for the condition of 
the economy” (Bond and Fleisher 2001, 530). Unfortunately, this assumption may not always be 
empirically valid, because it assumes that individuals receive and are able to process information 
about the state of the economy. To test the effects of the economy on individuals, Bond and 
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Fleisher (2001) and Clarke et al. (2005) suggest that at an individual-level it is more valid to ask 
respondents about their retrospective and prospective assessments of the condition of the 
economy. Following the advice of Bond and Fleisher (2001) and Clarke et al. (2005), I use 
retrospective and prospective assessments in the individual-level models detailed in Chapter 5; 
therefore, I expect to find in comparing individuals, those with positive retrospective and 
prospective assessments of the state of the economy will be more likely to approve of the 
president than will those individuals who hold negative retrospective and prospective 
assessments of the state of the economy (EF 4.2). 
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, my individual-level models also include 
variables controlling for divided government; therefore, I expect to find evidence indicating that 
during times of divided government, presidential job approval ratings are comparatively higher 
than presidential job approval ratings during times of unified government (EF 4.3). 
Extant essays examining the “gender gap” report that differences exist between men and 
women in terms of how they approve or disapprove of political actors and actions; however, 
scholarly literature on presidential approval ratings has largely ignored these differences (Clarke 
et al. 2005). Clarke et al. (2005) argue that it is important for analyst to consider the gender gap 
when examining presidential approval ratings; because, by “assuming homogeneity between men 
and women in the forces driving approval ratings,” researchers may report spurious estimates 
(Clarke et al. 2005, 31). I expect to find evidence indicating support for a “gender gap”, or more 
specifically, evidence indicating women are more likely to approve of Democratic Party 
presidents than they are of Republican Party presidents, and men are be more likely to approve 
of Republican Party presidents than they are of Democratic Party presidents (EF 4.4).  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Scholarly literature on executive orders and presidential approval ratings is not extensive. 
In fact, it seems no study has ever been published examining the relationship between those 
variables by any social science journal or publisher. Literature on the president’s use of unilateral 
powers has become abundant in the last two decades (Howell 2005); literature on presidential job 
approval ratings is no less abundant (Gronke and Newman 2003). However, it seems no 
published study has examined the relationship between the two concepts. Ouyang (2012) is the 
only existing study (published or not) that has examined this relationship. 5 
 Ouyang (2012) argues presidents are constrained in the number of executive orders that 
they issue by public opinion – in that they issue differing numbers of executive orders during 
times of high and low levels of presidential approval. Using American National Election Study 
(ANES) surveys (1981-2001), he finds evidence to show that presidents will issue fewer 
executive orders during times of high diffuse support (support for the presidential institution as a 
whole); and more such orders during times of low diffuse support, but the level of diffuse 
support only constrains non-salient executive orders (executive orders of which the public is 
unaware). Ouyang argues that this relationship exists because presidents prefer to not use 
executive orders during times of high diffuse support. Because their use can lead to lower diffuse 
support levels if Congress or the Supreme Court overturn the executive order. Issuing executive 
orders can also sour relations between the president and Congress, and this may affect diffuse 
                                                 
5 Ouyang (2012) was not published in a professional journal; however, it was selected to be 
presented at the 2012 American Political Science Association Conference (the conference was 
cancelled before Ouyang (2012) could be presented due to Hurricane Isaac). 
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support negatively. Finally, executive orders can also harm the president’s image, thus lowering 
diffuse support (Ouyang 2012, 11).6 
Jones (2014), similar to Ouyang (2012), examined the relationship between executive 
orders and presidential approval ratings; however, Jones (2014) found no relationship between 
the two concepts. Jones (2014) used a newly-created dataset to model aggregate level 
presidential job approval ratings from 1969 to 2012. The study found that the only statistically 
significant predictors of presidential job approval ratings at an aggregate level were previous 
presidential job approval ratings and presidential honeymoon periods (i.e., the six months 
immediately following a president’s inauguration). As an explanatory variable, executive orders 
failed to achieve statistical significance. Jones (2014) hypothesized this to be the case because 
the public, despite frequent attempts by the media to make executive orders a salient issue, does 
not attend to the president’s use executive orders, because the majority of the public is generally 
politically unaware of the executive orders. Unfortunately, Jones (2014) did not analyze 
individual-level data, and the study was only intended to operate as a gateway to future research 
on this subject. Jones’s (2014) study may have suffered from a number of problems, including 
using only aggregate-level data; and not differentiating between salient and non-salient executive 
orders.  
 Because Ouyang (2012) and Jones (2014) are the only existing studies to test the 
relationship between executive orders and public opinion, it is necessary to examine both types 
                                                 
6 Ouyang (2012) assumes that an executive order the public does not like can harm a president’s 
diffuse support. This presupposes a negative relationship between executive orders and diffuse 
support. This thesis argues a similar negative relationship exist between executive orders and 
specific support (support for specific presidents, as opposed to support for the presidency as a 
whole). 
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of studies (executive orders and presidential approval rating literatures) separately to specify the 
models estimated in this paper.  
2.1 The Unilateral Presidency 
Studies on unilateral powers were published before 1999; however, it was not until Moe 
and Howell’s studies (1999a, 1999b) that the extant literature began to focus on a theory of 
presidential use of unilateral powers. Moe and Howell (1999a, 1999b) argue that a president’s 
power to act unilaterally exists specifically because these powers were not enumerated in the 
Constitution; and, because of this, Congress or the courts are unlikely to restrict unilateral power. 
These powers have grown over time because presidents are motivated to enhance their legacy 
and, to do so, requires power. Accordingly, at the very least, no matter their other intentions, 
presidents are motivated to enhance their own power (Moe and Howell 1999a, 1999b). 
 Moe and Howell (1999a, 1999b) argue that although presidents are motivated to enhance 
their own power, they cannot extend this power too greatly or too rapidly without facing 
constraints. Congress, the courts and, to a much lesser extent, the public constrain presidents, 
because Congress can draft legislation against a particular executive order, and the Supreme 
Court can invalidate particular executive orders. Thus, presidents must be strategic about the 
times during which they can safely enhance their power without potentially harming their long-
term legacy (Moe and Howell 1999a, 138). 
 Since Moe and Howell (1999a, 1999b) studies of unilateral power have expanded in 
number. Deering and Maltzman (1999) report that presidents use executive orders to bypass 
Congress, but only when presidents think the Congress will not overturn the executive order by 
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legislating to contravene the president’s policy goal. Mayer and Price (2002) find that presidents 
use executive orders to affect significant policy change and to send strategic signals to other 
actors in the political system, such as members of Congress. Cooper (2001) argues that 
sometimes presidents use executive memoranda (a type of executive action by presidents that is 
similar to executive orders, but are not published in the Federal Register) (Cooper 2001, 128) 
instead of executive orders to confuse others in the policy making arena, even though the use of 
an executive order would be more direct (Cooper 2001, 140). Because the Federal Register Act 
governs executive orders, but not memoranda (Cooper 2001, 128), presidents may issue an 
executive order that is a public record, but also issue a memorandum that is not a public record to 
conceal pertinent information about the executive order, which can lead to confusion among 
other political actors outside of the executive branch (Cooper 2001, 138). Howell and Lewis 
(2002) find that presidents reorganize and create executive branch organizations to minimize 
congressional ability to constrain the president and to maximize their own ability to control these 
agencies, thus enhancing their own unilateral power. 
 More recently, Fine and Warber (2012) find that presidents issue three different types of 
executive orders (major, routine, and symbolic), and previous research has not sufficiently 
distinguished these types of executive orders. Symbolic executive orders are executive orders 
that do not have any implications on policy, or executive agency management. Most symbolic 
executive orders are used to honor dead presidents or to create seals and medals (Fine and 
Warber 2012, 262). Routine executive orders are executive orders that, “do not drastically depart 
from existing or newly created policies enacted by Congress” (Fine and Warber 2012, 262). 
These are executive orders that are designed to carry out the intent of Congress (Warber 2006, 
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141). Major executive orders are executive orders that create significant and substantive public 
policies that depart from the “original intent of Congress” (Warber 2006, 143). Fine and Warber 
(2012) find that symbolic and routine executive orders are more likely to be issued during times 
of unified government and when Congress is ideologically proximate to the president. During 
times of divided government, presidents are more likely to issue major executive orders because 
their legislative preferences diverge from those of Congress (272). Thus, Fine and Warber (2012) 
conclude that divided and unified government play important roles in the type of executive 
orders that presidents issue. 
 Most unilateral power research attempts to explain the conditions in which presidents act 
unilaterally and why; however, recent research by Warber (2014), and Rottinghaus and Warber 
(2015) have focused on how presidents use their unilateral powers to target specific 
constituencies to potentially enhance their own approval ratings with those constituencies. 
Warber (2014), argues unilateral power literature often assumes executive orders are 
solely directed at the bureaucratic offices that make up the executive branch, however, this 
assumption is not entirely correct. Warber (2014) hypothesizes that presidents may issue 
executive orders that are directed at specific interests. Using the same executive orders 
classification scheme discussed previously (symbolic, routine, and major executive orders), 
Warber (2014), reports that presidents do issue executive orders targeted at specific audiences. 
Specifically, Democratic presidents issued nearly twice as many major executive orders per year 
than Republic presidents that targeted specific interests (Warber 2014, 281). Additionally, both 
parties issue more major executive orders than they do symbolic and routine executive orders 
when targeting specific interests (Fine 2014, 282). Unfortunately, Warber (2014) is unable to 
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address why presidents target specific interests when they issues executive orders. The author 
suggest future research must be conducted to examine this question if unilateral power research 
is to advance beyond explaining why presidents issues executive orders. 
 Expanding upon Warber (2014), Rottinghaus and Warber (2015), merge unilateral 
presidency research with research on the public presidency, and identify the conditions in which 
presidents can target specific groups when issuing executive orders and executive proclamations. 
According to public presidency literature, presidents seek to lead and represent the public. 
Rottinghaus and Warber (2015) argue that the president can seek to lead and represent the public 
through unilateral directives by issuing constituency based executive orders and executive 
proclamations. The authors finding suggest that presidents issue more constituency targeting 
executive proclamations when Congress possesses a large majority party, or when divided 
government occurs (Rottinghaus and Warber 2015, 306). The authors argue the reason for this 
finding is because when institutional friction exist presidents need to appeal to their constituents 
even when they may be unable to get their way in terms of substantive policy, and executive 
proclamations are one way in which presidents can appeal to their constituents (Rottinghaus and 
Warber 2015, 303). Rottinghaus and Warber (2015) report presidents do not issue constituency 
targeting executive orders when institutional friction exists because presidents may be less 
willing to issue executive orders, because executive orders have policy implications that 
proclamations do not have. Presidents are more likely to issue constituency targeting executive 
orders during election years, and during their first year in office (Rottinghaus and Warber 2015, 
304-305). Thus, presidents issue executive orders and proclamations that target specific 
constituencies in order to lead and represent the public. 
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 Seeking to address a research gap in unilateral power literature – research has generally 
tended to focus on the institutional and behavioral factors that influence presidential power 
(Young 2013, 329) – Young (2013) studied the role natural disasters, foreign policy crises, and 
economic crises has in the president’s ability to expand unilateral powers. Young (2013) argues 
presidents are aware of the environment in which they operate, and will attempt to capitalize on 
moments that present the largest opportunity to increase their power (348). Using negative 
binomial regression, Young (2013), finds foreign policy crises present the best opportunity for 
presidents to increase their power (349). Foreign policy crises were found to have a positive 
statistically significant effect on presidential unilateral power. During foreign policy crises 
presidential unilateral power (as measure by the number of significant executive order issued) 
increased dramatically. Economic crises and natural disasters were found to have no significant 
impact on unilateral power. Suggesting that presidents are unwilling or unable to enhance their 
own power during economic crises and natural disasters. 
 A recent unilateral powers study (Reeves and Rogowski 2016a), using four nationally 
representative surveys, reports that the public has low levels of support for unilateral power use, 
and these mass attitudes of presidential unilateral power use are stable over time. The authors 
argue that evaluations of the president are structured by citizens’ commitment to core democratic 
values (Reeves and Rogowski 2016a, 27). The authors report that public support for direct 
unilateral action is conditioned by context. Public support for unilateral action increases by 20 
percentage points during congressional gridlock7 and when dealing with matters of national 
                                                 
7 Congressional gridlock occurs when Congress refuses or is unable to pass legislation. 
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security (27). Surprisingly, the authors report partisanship and evaluations of the president do not 
strictly shape attitudes about unilateral power use. 
 Reeves and Rogowski (2016b), using a series of nationally representative survey 
samples, report the public is responsive to the methods in which presidents intend to use to 
achieve their policy goals. In the survey, respondents reported lower approval ratings for 
hypothetical presidential candidates that intended to achieve their policy goals by acting 
unilaterally. Candidates that intended to achieve their policy goals by working with Congress 
received higher approval ratings. By using another national representative survey that asked 
respondent whether they approve or disapprove of a series of policies that presidents from 
Lincoln to Obama have achieved through acting unilaterally, Reeves and Rogowski (2016b) 
report that attitudes toward unilateral power shape how voters evaluate policies presidents have 
achieved through unilateral means (19). Both findings suggest that the public report lower 
approval ratings when presidents act unilaterally, as opposed to acting legislatively, and when 
policies are achieved through acting unilaterally members of the public that do not approve of 
the president acting unilaterally are less likely to support the policy. Thus, public opinion serves 
as an important constraint on presidents’ use of unilateral powers (Reeves and Rogowski 2016b, 
21). 
2.2 The First Wave of Presidential Approval Ratings Research 
 Early studies, and indeed most studies, on presidential approval ratings or presidential 
popularity are derived from Mueller’s (1970, 1973) seminal research. Mueller, using multiple 
OLS regression and Gallup’s presidential popularity question, over a 24-year period beginning 
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with the Truman administration and ending with the Johnson administration, finds four key 
insights on presidential approval ratings. First, he finds statistically significant evidence 
indicating president’s popularity decline over time.8 He hypothesizes this is the case because, 
even if an administration acts with majority support on each issue, it can eventually alienate 
enough political minorities to be defeated and, in the process, lower popularity will result 
because public disillusionment with the President occurs over time. This disillusionment occurs 
because presidents, while seeking election, invariably say or imply they will do more than then 
they can feasibly do during their term in office (Mueller 1970, 20). Second, he finds statistically 
significant evidence indicating increases in national unemployment cause the president to receive 
lower approval ratings, but decreases in unemployment have no effect on presidential approval 
ratings. Third, he finds evidence indicating presidential approval ratings increase during rally-
around-the-flag periods. Finally, he finds evidence indicating presidential approval ratings 
decline during times of war. 
 Gronke and Newman (2003) report that presidential approval research has generally 
advanced in three waves; with the first wave consisting of reactions to Mueller’s (1970, 1973) 
seminal research (502). The first to react to Mueller (1970, 1973) was Stimson (1976). Stimson 
(1976) finds that presidential popularity follows a cyclical pattern, in which presidents begin 
their terms with high popularity, but experience parabolic declines, resulting in a loss of popular 
                                                 
8 Nearly every study dealing with presidential approval ratings recognizes a negative trend in 
presidential approval ratings after a president takes office. The citations are too numerous to 
include them all here. For some examples see: Stimson (1976); Kernell (1978); Monroe 
(1978); Siegelman and Knight (1983); Brody (1991); Gronke and Brehm (2002); Eichenberg, 
Stoll, and Lebo (2006); Beck, Carr, and Walmsley (2012); Berlemann, Enkelmann, and 
Kuhlenkasper (2012); and Berlemann, and Enkelmann (2014). 
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support for about three years, and then recover some at the ends of their terms. Whereas Mueller 
(1970, 1973) attributed this decline to a coalition of minorities, Stimson (1976) attributed the 
cyclical decline in presidential approval ratings over time to uninformed citizens having 
exaggerated expectations of what the president can achieve that inevitably decline (Gronke and 
Newman 2003, 502). Refuting Mueller (1973) and Stimson (1976), Kernell (1978) agrees 
presidential approval ratings tend to decline over time; however, he argues that these declines 
occur because of “real events and conditions,” such as the economy, wars, scandals, and 
international events (Kernell 1978, 508). Similarly to Kernell (1978), Monroe (1978) reports 
declines in presidential approval ratings can be attributed to changes in inflation and military 
expenditures. By linking declines in presidential approval ratings to real world events, instead of 
time, Kernell (1978) and Monroe (1978) ushered in the second wave of presidential approval 
research (Gronke and Newman 2003, 503). 
2.3 The Second Wave of Presidential Approval Ratings Research 
 The second wave of presidential approval research, published in the early to mid-1980s, 
followed Kernell (1978) and Monroe (1978) by, “attempting to specify more realistically the 
links between the economy, political events, and approval” (Gronke and Newman 2003, 503). In 
an effort to make presidential approval models more realistic, researchers during the second 
wave of presidential approval research, debated the merits of different: model specification, lag 
structures, duration of effects, and estimation techniques (Gronke and Newman 2003, 503). 
MacKuen (1983) sought to identify how long-run rally-events affected presidential approval 
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ratings, while Norpoth and Yantek (1983) sought to identify how long-run economic conditions 
affected approval ratings.  
 Two important theoretical developments mark the second wave of presidential approval 
research (Gronke and Newman 2003, 504). The first important development was the rise of 
research focusing on the incentives presidents have to gain and maintain approval ratings. By 
focusing on the president’s incentive to maintain approval ratings, Ragsdale (1984), Ostrom and 
Job (1986), and Simon and Ostrom (1989) made their models more politically focused and 
realistic (Gronke and Newman 2003, 504). The second major development occurred when 
researchers began to focus on individual-level models.9 Previously, when researchers applied 
aggregate-level findings to individuals, they committed the ecological fallacy. By developing 
individual-level models researchers were able to test theories that could not be tested at an 
aggregate-level without committing that error. By using individual-level data, Ostrom and Simon 
(1985) report when presidents are successful in Congress, presidential approval ratings rise 
accordingly and, when presidents are less successful in the legislative arena, presidential 
approval ratings fall accordingly.10 
                                                 
9 See: Kernell and Hibbs (1981); Kinder (1981); Hibbs, Rivers, and Vasilitos (1982a, 1982b); 
Ostom and Simon (1985); and Tedin (1986). 
 
10 For other studies linking congressional success to presidential approval ratings see Brace and 
Hinckley (1992), and Cohen (2013). For studies linking presidential approval ratings to 
congressional success see Rivers and Rose (1985); Rohde and Simon (1985); Peterson (1990); 
Bond and Fleisher (1990); Cohen (1997); Kernell (1997); Canes-Wrong and de Marchi (2002); 
and Bond, Fleisher, and Wood (2003). 
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2.4 The Third Wave of Presidential Approval Ratings Research 
 The third, and current wave of presidential approval research, has been more diverse and 
less focused in its research. Early studies primarily focused on how the media and elite discourse 
shape presidential approval ratings (Gronke and Newman 2003, 504). Later studies, however, 
vary widely in their focus, and thus cannot be defined by any one specific focus. Brody (1991) 
reports that the media and elite discourse primarily shape public reactions of events and new 
presidents through a two-step process. In the first step events are evaluated by political elites, 
and then, during the second step, these evaluations are transmitted to the public via the mass 
media (Brody 1991).11  
Priming issues is another way in which the media shapes opinions (Miller and Krosnick 
2000).12 Priming causes people to place special weight on certain issues when evaluating the 
issue. When the media reports on some issues, but not others, the media primes the issues 
reported on by making the primed issue more politically salient to the public. By priming an 
issue the issue becomes more salient to the individual. Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch (1995) find 
that saliency of issues that affect presidential approval ratings (generally) vary over time, and 
that only salient issues impact presidential job approval ratings. The more salient the issue, the 
more impact that it has on presidential job approval ratings. For instance, if the public perceives 
the president as doing a good job handling foreign affairs, but doing poorly on the economy, 
presidential job approval ratings will reflect the issue that is more publically salient. If the more 
                                                 
11 For more studies on how elite discourse and the media shape presidential approval ratings see: 
West (1991); Mutz (1992, 1994); Goidel, Shields, and Peffley (1997); and Nadeau et al. 
(1999). 
12 For more research on priming see: Lyengar and Kinder (1987); and Krosnick and Kinder 
(1990). 
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publically salient issue is the economy, approval ratings will be low; if foreign affairs are more 
salient to the public, then approval ratings should be high.  
 Some third wave researchers, Bond and Fleisher (2001) and Lebo and Cassino (2007) 
focused their research on the widening partisan gap that exist in presidential approval ratings. 
Specifying logit models from individual-level data obtained from American National Election 
Surveys (ANES), Bond and Fleisher (2001) find evidence of a widening partisan gap affecting 
presidential approval ratings from 1972 to 2000. Members of the public belonging to the same 
political party as the president evaluate the president more positively than do members of the 
opposition party. The authors hypothesize this to be the case because, “the president’s partisans 
may be more likely to give him credit for a good economy and less likely to blame him for a bad 
economy than opposition partisans” (Bond and Fleisher 2001, 358). Thus, presidents are more 
likely to receive higher approval ratings from citizens with the same party affiliation as the 
president than they are of citizens not belonging to the same party affiliation as the president. 
Divided and unified government interact in theoretically interesting ways with 
presidential job approval ratings. Nicholson, Segura, and Woods (2002) find that divided 
government allows presidents to credibly pass blame onto other political actors, thus allowing for 
higher presidential job approval ratings. This effect occurs even when controlling for well-
known predictors of approval. Thus during times of divided government, presidents may have 
higher job approval ratings and issue more symbolic executive orders. 
 Clarke et al. (2005) highlight the importance of considering gender differences when 
modeling presidential approval ratings. By disaggregating 240 monthly Survey of Consumer 
datasets gathered from 1978 through 1997, Clarke et al. find evidence indicating the “gender 
22 
 
gap” between men and women’s presidential approval ratings are due to differences in how both 
sexes evaluate the economy and the president. Seeking to identify which type of economic 
evaluation model best fits men and women, Clarke et al. (2005) find that national prospective 
economic evaluation models perform the best for women, and personal prospective models work 
the best for men.13 This finding suggests that men and women assess the performance of the 
president by assessing the future state of the economy either for the nation (women) or for 
themselves (men).14 Clarke et al. report that women’s economic evaluations were consistently 
more negative than those of men, regardless of who the president was or the president’s party 
affiliation (Clarke et al. 2005, 51).  
 Using ARFIMA methods (discussed in more detail in Chapter 4), Lebo and Cassino 
(2007) continue Bond and Fleisher’s (2001) research on the presidential approval partisan gap. 
They find that partisans of both parties reward and punish, in terms of approval ratings, 
presidents of the opposite party on the basis of economic indicators, while remaining largely 
unresponsive to those indicators when their party holds the presidency (Lebo and Cassino 2007, 
740). Lebo and Cassino (2007) argue that although this finding may not be normatively 
desirable, partisans are not so biased as to completely ignore bad economic indicators when their 
party holds the presidency. If the economy is bad enough, partisans will respond accordingly by 
                                                 
13 National prospective models posit that individual give higher approval ratings when they 
believe the economy as a whole is going to do better in the future, and lower approval ratings 
when they believe the economy as whole is going to do worse in the future. Personal 
prospective models posit that individual give higher approval ratings when they believe their 
own personal economic situation is going to improve in the future, and lower approval ratings 
when they believe their own personal economic situation is going to worsen in the future. 
14 Prior to Clarke et al. many studies attempted to determine whether prospective or retrospective 
perceptions of the economy performed best when modelling presidential approval ratings (e.g., 
MacKuen et al. 1992; Clarke and Stewart 1994; and Norpoth 1996). 
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reporting lower presidential approval ratings even if they belong to the same political party as the 
president.  
 By conducting a series of correlation tests, and creating a structural equation model to 
“fully capture the interrelated nature of the personal and policy components of presidential 
approval” (McAvoy 2008, 294), McAvoy demonstrates that researchers cannot safely assume 
that Gallup’s presidential job approval question strictly measures job performance, because the 
question also measures presidential favorability. McAvoy reports that presidential favorability 
ratings measure respondents’ evaluations of a president’s character and image; and presidential 
job approval ratings measures a president’s competence. McAvoy’s overall findings contribute to 
the literature by highlighting the need to consider favorability ratings when trying to explain job 
approval ratings, even if favorability has a comparatively lesser effect on presidential job 
approval ratings than economic evaluations (297). 
 Newman and Forcehimes (2010) contribute to presidential approval literature by creating 
a list of major events from 1953 to 2006 that may impact presidential approval ratings. They 
argue that, although studies since Mueller (1970) recognize the importance of including control 
variables for major events that may affect presidential approval ratings, studies often diverge in 
the events that they select for inclusion and, by doing so, inhibit direct comparisons between 
them (Newman and Forcehimes 2010, 144). To create a uniform list of major events for study 
the authors include dozens of possibly significant events in a model of presidential approval 
ratings and report the events that had any statistically significant effect on presidential job 
approval ratings. Newman and Forcehimes implore all future researchers to use the list of 
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significant events discussed in their study because it provides for consistent comparison across 
studies and because their selection of events is ostensibly unbiased. 
 Newman and Forcehimes (2010) do not consider congressional committee probes in their 
list of events that can affect presidential approval ratings. Kriner and Schickler (2014), however, 
find evidence indicating congressional committee probes have significant negative effects on 
presidential approval ratings. Kriner and Schickler (2014) report Congress can and does use 
investigative committees to negatively harm the president’s standing in the public. By doing so 
Congress can check the president’s power even if they are unable to act legislatively to do so due 
to veto threats by the president (Kriner and Schickler 2014, 521). Thus, future studies that 
attempt to model every presidential event should consider including congressional committee 
probes in their list of significant events. 
Nearly all presidential approval rating research controlled for the national economy; 
however, four third wave researchers, Geys and Vermeir (2007) and Fauvelle-Aymar and 
Stemair (2013), specifically focused their research on how the national economy effects 
presidential job approval ratings. Controlling for the strength of the national economy, wars, 
scandals, rally-around-the-flag effects, and individual presidential terms, Geys and Vermeir 
(2007), find that the level of the tax burden and changes in the tax structure affected presidential 
approval ratings from 1959 through 2006. Interestingly, Geys and Vermeir find no statistically 
significant evidence of inflation’s or unemployment’s having any effect on presidential approval 
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ratings; however, budget deficits are found to have a statistically significant negative effect on 
presidential approval ratings.15 
Fauvelle-Aymar and Stemair (2013) find that changes in the speed of growth or decline 
in the stock market can model presidential job approval ratings. When stock market growth is 
decelerating presidential job approval ratings decrease; when growth is accelerating presidential 
job approval ratings increase. When the stock market is declining, and if it is declining at 
increasing rates the president is punished through lower job approval ratings. However, when the 
market is declining at a decreasing rate, the president is rewarded with comparatively higher job 
approval ratings. Burden and Mughan (2003) argue that the international economy is equally 
important to presidential job approval ratings and the public as is the national economy. They 
find that, during different periods during the last century, different aspects of the international 
economy (such as trade deficits, and exchange rates) increased and decreased in issue saliency to 
the American public. Because of the changes in issue saliency, these different aspects of the 
international economy had varying impacts on presidential job approval ratings depending on 
which aspect of the international economy was more politically salient to the public at the time. 
The authors argue that these aspects of the international economy substantially affect presidential 
job approval ratings when they become salient to the American public. 
Interestingly, some presidential approval rating research has focused on the role emotions 
and genetics play in presidential approval ratings. González-Bailón et al. (2012) examine 
                                                 
15 Similarly to Geys and Vermeir (2007), most research on presidential approval ratings measures 
aggregate responses to objective economic indicators. For studies that use subjective 
indicators of the economy, see: MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992); Clarke and Stewart 
(1994); Norpoth 1996; Bond and Fleisher (2001); and, Clarke et al. (2005). 
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approval ratings from a social-psychological perspective. Specifically they use online 
discussions to examine the emotions of the discussion posters following significant presidential 
events. They study the discussions by coding them for varying levels of three emotional 
dimensions: valence, arousal, and dominance. Then the authors model trends in valence, arousal, 
and dominance to trends in political evaluations (specifically presidential approval ratings) over 
a five year period (September 1999 to February 2005). Valence measures words that are 
associated with feelings of happiness, satisfaction, and hope. The higher the score the more 
happy or satisfied the subject is; however, lower scores represent sadness and despair (González-
Bailón et al. 2012, 127). Arousal measures words that are associated with feelings of excitement, 
anger, or frenzy. Dominance, as the name suggest, measures a subjects feelings of domination or 
being in control versus feelings of submission or awe (González-Bailón et al. 2012, 127). 
González-Bailón et al. (2012) report that high levels of anger might contribute to positive 
evaluations of presidents at the beginning of wars (134). The angrier the public grows the better 
evaluations become for presidents. The authors found valence and dominance feelings to be 
statistically insignificant. Their findings are consistent with rally-around-the-flag-effect literature 
and the finding the approval ratings start off high when wars start, but decline as wars draft on. 
Perhaps the most important new research to come out on presidential approval ratings, 
Miles (2015), demonstrates that roughly 62% of the variation in presidential approval ratings are 
genetically heritable (773). Miles (2015) argues genes are “substantially more influential on 
individual evaluations of presidential performance than [socialization]” (773). If Miles (2015) 
results are theoretically valid than genetics plays a more important role in the development of 
political attitudes and characteristics than socialization. In terms of presidential approval ratings, 
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Miles (2015) finds the genetic makeup of individual’s influence how they perceive and interpret 
presidential behavior in the short and long terms (773). Thus, genetic predispositions and 
heritability can “explain why rally events, honeymoon periods, and the economy influence short-
term evaluations of presidential performance” (Miles 2015, 773). 
 The extant literature on presidents’ use of unilateral powers has grown substantially since 
Moe and Howell (1999a, 1999b); however, additional analyses are needed to study the 
relationship between presidential approval ratings and executive orders. The literature suggests 
that many variables impact a president’s approval ratings. Most of these variables fall into one of 
Mueller’s (1970, 1973) three categories: political variables, war-related variables, and event 
dummy variables (Berlemann and Enkelmann 2014, 46). The next chapter of this thesis seeks to 
use and expand upon past presidential approval research by modeling aggregate-level 
presidential job approval ratings using political variables, war-related variables, and event 
dummies, while also including variables to test the main theory and hypotheses of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 3: AGGREGATE-LEVEL MODELS 
This chapter begins by examining the data and methodology used to create two 
aggregate-level models, including how the data were obtained and how it was coded. After this I 
discuss some of the problems inherent in time series data. Thus I present some of the bivariate 
analysis results, followed by the results of ordinary least squares regression estimation of two 
fixed effects models discussed in this chapter. I then end the chapter with a discussion of how the 
results of this paper differ from prior research. 
3.1 Data and Methodology 
Two models are estimated at an aggregate level. 16 Both models employ monthly data, 
beginning in January 1953; however, due to data limitations Model 1 includes data through 2012, 
and Model 2 only includes data through 2002. Doing so yields 706 and 585 unique observations 
respectively. The primary difference between the two models is that there is two variants of the 
main variable of interest (Executive Orders). The executive orders variable can be subdivided 
into two types: model 1 includes an executive orders variable that is a count of every executive 
order issued in each month from 1953 to 2012; model 2 includes the same executive order 
variable; however, it only include salient executive orders. Salient executive orders are defined 
as those executive orders that are theoretically salient to the public, because they are featured by 
news outlets and other forms of mass media. As previously discussed using data from Howell 
                                                 
16 Other models and variables were estimated; however, this paper only discusses the models and 
variables that provided the best fit. 
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(2005) 17, an executive order is considered a salient executive order when it is non-ceremonial 
and featured on the front page of The New York Times.  
The main dependent variable of all aggregate-level models (Average Approval) is the 
average presidential job approval ratings for each month. To obtain this average, I use data 
drawn from Gallup polls to measure presidential job approval ratings for each month. Then, I 
average all approval ratings during the month to reach the mean presidential approval ratings in 
each month. Presidential approval ratings for January, following presidential elections, are 
indicative of the public’s view of the incoming president, because approval ratings for the 
incumbent president were missing in most cases.18 
The main independent variable of both aggregate-level models (Executive Orders) is a 
variable measuring the total count of the month’s executive orders issued by the president.19 To 
code this variable, I use data obtained from Howell (2005). There are two aggregate-level 
models, and both models use different versions of the Executive Orders variable (see above). 
Both variables are used to test Hypothesis 1 and 2. 
Each aggregate-level model also contains the same vector of control variables. These 
include control variables for: previous monthly presidential job approval ratings (Lagged 
Approval); the stock market (Stock Market Index); the consumer price index (CPI); the 
unemployment rate (Unemployment); divided government (Divided Government); the presence 
                                                 
17 Unfortunately this data only goes through 2002, and because of this Model 2 has fewer 
observations (n=585). 
18 Presidential job approval ratings that were missing following presidential elections are left 
missing in the dataset; however, in all other cases linear interpolation was used to replace the 
missing presidential job approval ratings data. 
19 Lagging this variable and the other variables discussed below (Unemployment, CPI, and 
SP_Comp) had no significant effect on the models. 
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or absence of honeymoon periods (Honeymoon); scandals (Watergate and Iran Contra); the first 
Iraq war, the second Iraq war, the Afghanistan war, and the 2007 surge in combat troops (Desert 
Storm, Military Casualties (Iraq), Military Casualties (Afghanistan), Iraq_War, and Surge 
respectively); the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks (9/11); and dummy variables for each 
president in the study (Eisenhower-Obama) to control for period effects during each of their 
respective administrations. 
A previous month’s average approval ratings are created by lagging the average 
presidential approval variable by one month. 20 Because previous research has shown that a 
president’s approval ratings are largely a function of previous approval ratings; including this 
variable is a necessity in order to avoid autocorrelation and thus bias in the parameter estimates 
(Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair 2013). CPI is the monthly Consumer Price Index all urban 
consumers. Stock Market Index is the monthly Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 stock market 
index21. Jones (2014) used unemployment data as an indicator of the nation’s economic well-
being; however, this indicator variable failed to achieve statistical significance in any model. 
Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair (2013) recommend that scholars employ a stock market index as 
an indicator variable for the nation’s economic well-being because presidential job approval 
ratings are highly associated with the economic well-being of the country. The paper uses both 
variables. Doing so allows me to test the validity of Expected Finding 4.2. Unemployment is the 
                                                 
20 The first observation for each presidency is dropped from the study because a lag for their 
previous presidential approval ratings does not exist within the dataset. 
21 CPI and the S&P 500 stock market index were obtained from a dataset hosted by the economic 
department of Yale University and created by Robert Shiller, Fumiko Kon-Ya and Yoshiro 
Tsutsui. http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm (accessed October 13, 2015) 
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monthly unemployment rate. Data for this variable were obtained from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics Current Population Survey. 22 
Divided Government is a dichotomous variable that is coded one (1) when either chamber 
of Congress’ majority party are not that of the president; it is coded zero (0) otherwise. 
Theoretically, presidential approval ratings should be higher ceteris paribus during times of 
divided government because it allows a president to credibly blame Congress for governmental 
failures (Nicholson, Segura, and Woods 2002). This variable, and the accompanying divided 
government variables, directly test Expected Finding 4.3. Honeymoon is a dichotomous variable 
used to control for “honeymoon” periods (Expected Finding 4.4). Jones (2014) included this 
variable and found it to have a statistically significant impact on presidential job approval 
ratings. It is coded one (1) during the first six months of a newly-inaugurated president’s term, 
and zero (0) otherwise. 
The rest of the non-presidential dummy variables in the model are used to control for 
wars, scandals, and rally-around-the-flag effects that may independently impact presidential 
approval ratings (Geys and Vermeir 2008, 308; and Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair 2013, 
414). Omitting these variables would likely cause omitted variable bias, and bias the estimates of 
both models. It is likely that at the start of a war, presidential approval ratings will increase as 
citizens react in a rally-around-the-flag effect (Geys and Vermeir 2008, 308), but as the war 
continues, presidential approval ratings may decrease because of the increasing amount of battle 
deaths associated with the war (Geys and Vermeir 2008, 308). Scandals are theorized to exert a 
negative impact on presidential approval ratings. Both Watergate and the Iran-Contra Affair, for 
                                                 
22 http://www.bls.gov/home.htm (accessed October 13, 2015) 
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example, should have negative statistically significant effects on presidential approval ratings. 
Rally-around-the-flag effects should exert positive changes in presidential approval in 
subsequent months at least in the short-term.  During times of national crises, rally-around-the-
flag effects should theoretically increase presidential approval ratings because a public mood of 
national unity tends to permeate the country such that presidents will observe comparatively 
higher presidential job approval ratings in the short-term (Geys and Vermeir 2008, 308). 
There are four variables pertaining to war in this study: Operation Enduring Freedom 
(Military Casualties (Afghanistan)), Operation Iraqi Freedom (Military Casualties (Iraq)), 
Iraq_War (referring to Operation Iraqi Freedom), and Desert Storm. 23 Operations Enduring and 
Iraqi Freedom are both monthly counts of military casualties pertaining to each war. Iraq_War is 
a variable pertaining to the second Iraq war and Operation Iraqi Freedom, but instead of being a 
count of military casualties, Iraq_War is a dichotomous variable coded (1) from March 2003 
through September 2003 and (0) otherwise. 24 Desert Storm is a dummy variable pertaining to the 
1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the subsequent U.S. military response (Operations Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm). Similarly to Geys and Vermeir (2008), this variable is coded (1) 
during each month from August 1990 to January 1991, and (0) otherwise25. It is theorized that 
Military Casualties (Afghanistan) and Military Casualties (Iraq) will both have a negative effect 
                                                 
23 Due to data limitations (I was unable to gain access to credible statistics on Vietnam battle 
deaths) no variable was included for the Vietnam War. Theoretically the presidential dummy 
variables included in this study should account for the effects of the Vietnam War on 
presidential job approval ratings. 
24 Geys and Vermeir 2008 and Fauvelle-Aymar and Stemair (2013) include a similarly coded 
variable; however, the dates used in this paper differ by a few months. Both papers begin their 
second Iraq War variable in the first quarter of 2003 and end it in the second quarter. 
25 This study uses monthly data, but Geys and Vermeir (2008) used quarterly data. 
33 
 
on presidential job approval ratings, because of the length of both wars and the staggering 
military casualties for the U.S.A. Desert Storm may have a positive effect on presidential job 
approval ratings because of the short nature of the war and the much lower military casualties 
(Geys and Vermeir, 2008). Geys and Vermeir (2008) and Fauvelle-Aymar and Stemair (2013) 
consider Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm to be a rally-around-the-flag effect variable. 
Similarly, I hypothesize the first few months of the second Iraq War (Iraq_War) will have a 
positive effect on presidential approval ratings and behave similarly to a rally-around-the-flag 
effect variable. 
Two scandal control variables are included in this study: Watergate and Iran Contra. 
Both variables borrow a similar coding scheme from Geys and Vermeir (2008). As its name 
suggest, Watergate controls for the 1970s Watergate scandal that affected President Nixon. It is 
coded (1) for all months from April 1973 to June 1974, and (0) otherwise. The Iran-Contra 
Scandal affected President Reagan during the later months of 1986 and the early months of 1987. 
To code this variable, all months between October 1986 and March 1987 are coded (1), and (0) 
otherwise. 
Besides Desert Storm, one other rally-around-the-flag-effect variable is included in this 
study: the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. Because of the dramatic increase in presidential 
approval ratings following the attack and the remarkably slow decay in approval ratings after the 
attack (Gaines 2002; Hetherington and Nelson 2003) I follow the advice of Geys and Vermeir 
(2008) and code this variable as (0) in all months before the attack and as (1/t) beginning in 
September for all months afterwards (where t = 1, 2, 3, …). Dividing (1) by (t) for all months 
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after September 11, 2001 allows the variable to capture the effect of the slow decay in 
presidential job approval ratings following the event.  
The final vector of control variables in the proposed study is a series of dummy variables 
that represent when each respective president was in office. There is one variable for each 
president included in this study (Eisenhower to Obama). This vector thus specifies fixed effects 
for the model allowing me to control for period effects during each presidents administration. 
This will also allow me to test if executive orders had differing levels of issue saliency to the 
public under each individual president. Each variable is coded one (1) during the respective 
president’s presidency, and zero (0) otherwise.  
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 1 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 = ?̂?1(𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠) + ?̂?2(𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙)𝑡−1 +
?̂?3(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) + ?̂?4(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) + ?̂?5(𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒) +
?̂?6(𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) + ?̂?7(𝐻𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑) + ?̂?8(𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒) +
?̂?9(𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎) + ?̂?10(𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑚) + ?̂?11(𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑞 𝑊𝑎𝑟) +
?̂?12(𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑞) + ?̂?13(𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐴𝑓𝑔ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛) +
?̂?14(𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑞 "𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒") + ?̂?15−25(𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑛ℎ𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 − 𝑂𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎)  
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 2 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 = ?̂?1(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠) + ?̂?2(𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙)𝑡−1 +
?̂?3(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) + ?̂?4(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) + ?̂?5(𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒) +
?̂?6(𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) + ?̂?7(𝐻𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑) + ?̂?8(𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒) +
?̂?9(𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎) + ?̂?10(𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑚) + ?̂?11(𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑞 𝑊𝑎𝑟) +
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?̂?12(𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑞) + ?̂?13(𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐴𝑓𝑔ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛) +
?̂?14(𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑞 "𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒") + ?̂?15−25(𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑛ℎ𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 − 𝑂𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎)  
3.2 Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analysis 
 Table 1 (see Appendix A) contains a number of descriptive statistics including the 
monthly minimum, maximum, and mean of the following variables: presidential job approval 
ratings (Presidential Approval); executive orders (E.O. and Salient E.O.); the S&P stock market 
index (Stock Market Index); the Consumer Price Index all urban consumers (CPI); and 
Unemployment.26 The stock market and consumer price indices are not particularly informational 
on their own, because of the time series nature of the data used and monetary inflation; therefore, 
I have also included descriptive statistics of the percentage change in both variables. Of 
particular interest, the executive orders variable has a maximum of 19 executive orders issued in 
a month, but the maximum number of salient executive orders in a month was only four; 
however, both maxima only occur once in this dataset. Tables 2 and 3 (see Appendix A) contain 
frequency distributions of both executive order variables. As can be seen from the tables the 
modes for both executive order variables are three and zero respectively (occurring in 118 and 
457 different months respectively). 
 Figure 1 (see Appendix A) is a graph that depicts the relationship between mean average 
monthly approval ratings and all executive orders. Table 4 depicts the same relationship as 
Figure 1, but using mean comparison analysis instead of a graph. The figures indicates either a 
                                                 
26 Unless noted otherwise, all data discussed in this section and the relevant tables and figures in 
Appendix A use the original unmodified data that I collected before I fractionally differenced 
and made each series stationary. 
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very slight positive relationship or no relationship between the two at all. Conducting a Pearson’s 
r correlation indicates a weak positive statistically significant correlation of .07 between all 
executive orders and presidential job approval ratings. 27 These findings are contrary to my main 
hypothesis; however, a correlation of .07 is too low to consider it as definitive evidence against 
Hypothesis 1. 
 Conducting the same hypotheses test between presidential job approval ratings and 
salient executive orders provides clearer evidence as to the validity of Hypothesis 1. Figure 2 
depicts the relationship between mean average monthly approval ratings and salient executive 
orders only. Table 5 is the accompanying mean comparison chart. Both indicate a strong positive 
relationship between the two variables. As the number of salient executive orders issued in a 
month increases, presidential job approval ratings increase; however, the strength of this 
relationship is not as strong as the graph and mean comparison analysis seems to indicate. A 
Pearson’s r correlation of the two variables indicates a rather weak relationship (r = .132) 
between the two but it is a statistically significant correlation result. The correlation between 
presidential job approval ratings and salient executive orders is much higher than the correlation 
between presidential job approval ratings and all executive orders; however, it is also far too low 
to provide any notable support for Hypothesis 1. 
 To test the remaining hypotheses using bivariate methods I estimated Pearson correlation 
tests between presidential job approval ratings and the following variables: the previous month’s 
presidential job approval ratings (i.e., presidential job approval ratings lagged by one month); the 
                                                 
27 See Appendix A and Table 6 for Pearson’s r correlations of lagged approval ratings, all 
executive orders, significant executive orders only, stock market index, and the consumer price 
index on presidential job approval ratings. 
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S&P stock market index (Stock Market Index); the consumer price index (CPI); divided 
government; and honeymoon. 28 Not surprisingly, and consistent with the literature (Nicholson, 
Segura, and Woods 2002; Burden and Mughan 2003; Geys and Vermeir 2008; Newman and 
Forcehimes 2010; Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair 2013), the correlation between presidential job 
approval ratings and lagged presidential job approval ratings is positive and highly statistically 
significant with a correlation of .930. Surprisingly, the correlation between the S&P Stock 
Market Index and presidential job approval ratings is negative and highly statistically significant 
(r = -0.186). It was expected that the stock market index would be positive and statistically 
significant. This is inconsistent with prior research (Fauvelle-Aymar and Stemair 2013) and 
Expected Finding 4.2. The CPI and presidential approval ratings correlation is in the expected 
direction (negative) and highly statistically significant with a correlation of -0.261. An increase 
in the consumer price index should have a theoretically negative impact on presidential approval 
ratings (Fauvelle-Aymar and Stemair 2013) and according to the correlation test it does. 
 Unfortunately, correlation tests between presidential job approval ratings and the divided 
government variable did not find evidence to support Expected Finding 4.3. The correlation 
between the two variables is statistically insignificant. Not surprisingly, and consistent with all 
prior research and Expected Finding 4.4, the correlation between presidential job approval 
ratings and the honeymoon period variable indicate a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the two, with r = 0.183. Correlation tests of presidential job approval 
ratings and the dummy variables for the Watergate and Iran-Contra Scandals were also 
conducted (see Table 7). Not surprisingly both variables possess negative correlations with 
                                                 
28 See Table 6 for the correlation results. 
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presidential job approval ratings; however, the correlation between the Iran-Contra scandal and 
presidential job approval ratings is statistically insignificant. 
While not particularly relevant to hypothesis testing I have also included a table 
containing information on each respective president’s average job approval rating and the 
average number of executive orders they issued monthly (see Table 8 in Appendix A). 
Examining the data there seems to be no noticeable difference in the average amounts of 
monthly executive orders issued by Republican and Democrat presidents; however, there is clear 
trend of decreasing amounts of executive orders issued monthly as time passes. In fact, after 
President Carter’s term in office the average amount of executive orders issued monthly 
dramatically declines for all future presidents. The average amount of salient executive orders 
issued monthly stays fairly consistent with slight declines after Presidents Kennedy and Reagan.  
3.3 A Brief Word on OLS Regression and Time Series Analyses 
Because this aggregate-level analysis of presidential job approval ratings uses monthly 
data, it is necessary to discuss some of the potential problems associated with time series 
analysis. The estimation technique used in this analysis is ordinary least squares regression 
(OLS), but OLS regression requires several assumptions that need to be met that time series data 
sometimes violate. The primary assumption that time series data are most likely to violate is the 
assumptions of data stationarity. If data are not stationary, then spurious estimates may be 
reported (Lanier 2003, 195). To solve the problem of non-stationary data researchers have relied 
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on using first differences to make their data stationary (Lanier 2003, 195)29; however, this 
technique may also lead to spurious regression if the data (series) is fractionally integrated 
because taking the first difference “may serve to create patterns in the data that are not naturally 
present” (Lanier 2003, 195). By fractionally differencing data, researchers can “more accurately 
capture the data-generating process underlying their data” (Lanier 2003, 195). 
 To determine if my data are fractionally integrated (e.g., the data can by differenced by d 
where 0<d<1 to make the data stationary) I use the Robinson’s Gaussian Semiparametric 
Estimation Procedure to estimate d (Robinson 1995), where d is the number of differences 
needed to make the series stationary and may be a non-integer (see above) (Lanier 2003, 196-
97). Table 9 in Appendix A shows the results of the Robinson’s Gaussian semiparametric 
estimation procedure (RGSE procedure). The RGSE procedure test two null hypotheses. The 
first is that d = 0, and the second is that d = 1. All series reject the null hypothesis that d = 1; 
however, the following series fail to reject the null hypothesis that d = 0: The Surge; Watergate; 
Divided Government; Eisenhower; Kennedy; Johnson; Nixon; Ford; Carter; Reagan; Bush; 
Clinton; George W. Bush; and Obama. Failing to reject the null hypothesis that d = 0 indicates 
that fractional differencing is not necessary for these variables. 30 The variables that do reject 
both null hypotheses need to be fractionally differenced by d, because they are fractionally 
integrated. Because they are fractionally integrated, I must difference the series by d, because, as 
                                                 
29 Geys and Vermeir (2008), and Fauvelle-Aymar and Stemair (2013) use first differences for 
their series. 
30 Because fractional differencing is not necessary, if a series is determined to be non-stationary 
first differencing may be used to make the series stationary. 
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mentioned above, differencing the series by an integer “may serve to create patterns in the data 
that are not naturally present” and result in spurious estimates (Lanier 2003, 195). 
 The traditional test for stationarity is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test; however, 
this method has limited power in the presence of fractional alternatives. When data are 
fractionally integrated it is more precise to use the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shinn 
(KPSS) test, because it is more robust to fractionally integrated data (Lanier 2003, 196-97). 31 
Conducting ADF test on the data indicates that the series are stationary; however, the Robinson’s 
Gaussian semiparametric estimation indicates that it is inappropriate to use ADF tests because all 
of the series are fractionally integrated. KPSS test on each series of data indicate that each series 
is non-stationary. After fractionally differencing the series that reject the null hypotheses of the 
RGSE procedure by d, and then conducting KPSS tests I find that all of the series of data are 
now stationary (See Table 10). 32 
 OLS regression also assumes homoscedasticity (the error term is the same across all 
values of the independent variable). If the assumption of homoscedasticity is violated the 
robustness of the model comes into questions. Homoscedasticity can inflate the significance of 
some variables in that the standard error of the coefficient parameters are biased downwardly, 
and deflate the significance of other variables. To combat homoscedasticity robust standard 
errors were used when estimating each model. By controlling for stationarity, fractional 
                                                 
31 See Geys and Vermeir (2008), and Fauvelle-Aymar and Stemair (2013) for studies that only 
use ADF test. 
32 All dichotomous (dummy) variables were made stationary by taking the first difference of the 
series.  
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integration, and homoscedasticity I have created more robust models than using OLS regression 
alone permits. 
3.4 Regression Results 
The results of both models can be found in Table 11 in Appendix A33. Despite previous 
findings indicating a slight (albeit positive, and not negative) relationship between presidential 
approval ratings and both executive orders variables, the hypothesis fails to find support in both 
models. At an aggregate-level, presidential approval ratings are not affected by the number of 
executive orders (salient or not) issued in a given month. Both models fail to find support for 
Expected Finding 4.1. Previous monthly presidential approval ratings do not have a statistically 
significant effect on the current month’s presidential approval ratings ceteris paribus.34 This is 
despite an overwhelming amount of prior research indicating it should (Nicholson, Segura, and 
                                                 
33 Coefficients are unstandardized. The constant was excluded from the model to allow for 
presidential dummy variables for each president. This decision was made after testing revealed 
which presidential dummy variable to exclude (if I kept the constant) had non-arbitrary effects 
on which variables were statistically significant.  
34 This suggest the lagged endogenous variable (lagged presidential approval ratings) may not be 
necessary to include in the models. It was included in this study due to the overwhelming 
amount of prior research that suggested it had significant impacts on presidential job approval 
ratings (Nicholson, Segura, and Woods 2002; Burden and Mughan 2003; Geys and Vermeir 
2008; Newman and Forcehimes 2010; Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair 2013), and because it 
controls for serial-autocorrelation. Because lagged presidential approval ratings was not 
statistically significant, I estimated a new model without the variable. When the lagged 
endogenous variables was not included in the estimation, military casualties in Afghanistan 
was found to be statistically insignificant. Besides military casualties in Afghanistan becoming 
statistically insignificant, no other significant changes occurred between models. It should be 
noted, however, that the model without lagged approval ratings suffers from slight positive 
autocorrelation. A Durbin-Watson test statistic of 1.77 was estimated for the model. Durbin-
Watson test statistics range in value from 0-4. A value of two (2) indicates no autocorrelation, 
a value of zero (0) indicates extreme positive autocorrelation, and a value of four (4) indicates 
extreme negative autocorrelation. 
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Woods 2002; Burden and Mughan 2003; Geys and Vermeir 2008; Newman and Forcehimes 
2010; Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair 2013).  
Not surprisingly, in both models CPI is negative and statistically significant, and Stock 
Market Index is positive and statistically significant. Both variables function as indicators of the 
national economy, and coefficients for each variable have the expected sign (negative for CPI, 
and positive for Stock Market Index). These findings are consistent with prior research 
(Nicholson, Segura, and Woods 2002; Burden and Mughan 2003; Geys and Vermeir 2008; 
Newman and Forcehimes 2010; Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair 2013). Consistent with my own 
prior research (Jones 2014) and other prior research (Nicholson, Segura, and Woods 2002; Geys 
and Vermeir 2008; Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair 2013), the unemployment variable is 
statistically insignificant in both models. 
The divided government variable included in both models is positive and statistically 
significant in both models. The results of both models lend support to the notion (Expected 
Finding 4.3) that presidents are more able to pass blame credibly to other political actors during 
times of divided government than they are during times of unified government (Nicholson, 
Segura, and Woods 2002). Jones (2014), however, found divided government to have no 
statistically significant effect on presidential approval ratings. Surprisingly, the Honeymoon 
variable is statistically insignificant in both models, despite prior research finding it to be 
statistically significant (Nicholson, Segura, and Woods 2002; Geys and Vermeir 2008; Fauvelle-
Aymar and Stegmair 2013). 
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The variables pertaining to the Watergate and Iran-Contra scandals fail to achieve 
statistical significance. The War variables do not fare much better.35 The variable measuring 
military casualties in the Afghanistan war is negative and statistically significant; however, the 
sign of the variable measuring military casualties in the second Iraq war is in the theoretically 
unexpected direction (positive) and statistically insignificant. Both dichotomous war variables 
(Desert Storm and Iraq War) possess the theoretically expected sign, but they fail to achieve 
statistical significance. This is not too surprising given that Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair (2013) 
also fail to find statistical significance for the Gulf War variables; however, it should be noted 
that Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair (2013) and I based both Gulf War variables from the coding 
used in Geys and Vermeir (2008) and latter set of authors did find statistical significance for both 
variables. 36 
                                                 
35 As previously discussed, the presidential fixed-effects variables estimated in both models 
should theoretically control for the effects of the Vietnam War on presidential approval ratings. 
To test this theory I created a control variable for the Vietnam War. The variable is coded (-1) 
during the Johnson administration, (1) during the Nixon administration, and (0) during all other 
administrations. This coding scheme is borrowed directly from Norpoth (1984) and Fauvelle-
Aymar and Stegmair (2013). Norpoth suggest the Vietnam War had a negative impact on 
Johnson’s approval ratings, and a positive impact on Nixon’s approval ratings. Because this 
new variable was found to be non-stationary, but not fractionally integrated, I took the first 
difference of the variable to make it stationary. The Vietnam War variable was not statistically 
significant when included in both models, and it had no significant impact on the models. This 
suggest that either the variable’s coding scheme is not theoretically valid, or that the fixed-
effects dummy variables are capturing the impacts of the Vietnam War on presidential 
approval ratings. Perhaps using U.S. military casualties during the Vietnam War would have 
statistically significant impacts on both models; however, I was unable to obtain reliable data 
on U.S. military casualties during the Vietnam War. 
36 I did, however, change the months coded (1) and the months coded (0) from the original 
coding of Geys and Vermeir (2008) for my second Gulf War variable (Iraq_War), and both 
papers (Geys and Vermeir 2008; and Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair 2013) used quarterly data 
instead of monthly data. Their doing so may promote more volatility in the variables, which 
could lead to statistically significant findings. 
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Most of the fixed-effects presidential dummy variables achieve statistical significance; 
however, some of their coefficient estimates are unexpectedly large (Eisenhower and Kennedy). 
This could be indicative of a problem with the model, or it could indicate that large period effects 
affected presidential approval ratings during Eisenhower and Kennedy’s respective presidencies. 
The dummy variables for Eisenhower and Kennedy are both negative and have fairly large 
coefficients (-76 and -70 respectively). Pearson’s r correlations on all presidential dummy 
variables reveal none have any correlation with each other except the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
variables with a correlation of 0.7. This correlation is high, and as variance inflation factors 
indicate, is causing multicollinearity to exist between the two variables.  
The decision to include two variables that are collinear was not made lightly. Testing of 
four different models revealed Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian 
Criterion (SBC) scores were lower for the model that included both the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
fixed-effects variables. Lower criterion scores indicate a better fitting model. Because, the 
models that excluded one or more of the Eisenhower, and Kennedy fixed-effects variables 
performed worse (i.e., higher criterion scores), choosing to use the model that included all 
presidential fixed-effects variables is the right decision. Multicollinearity increases the standard 
error of the estimated coefficients, and makes them unstable in several ways; however, 
multicollinearity is “only a problem for the variables that are collinear…. but so long as the 
collinear variables are only used as control variables and they are not collinear with your 
variables of interest, [multicollinearity is not a] problem” (Allison 2012). I have chosen to keep 
both variables in the final specification because they provide the best fit, the most explanatory 
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power, and have no adverse effect on the primary variables of interest to this study (executive 
orders). 
3.5 Conclusion 
The results presented here differ from those of previous research in several significant 
ways. Probably the most significant way is that in both models, the lagged dependent variable 
(presidential job approval ratings) was not statistical significant despite prior research suggesting 
that it should be (Nicholson, Segura, and Woods 2002; Burden and Mughan 2003; Geys and 
Vermeir 2008; Newman and Forcehimes 2010; Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair 2013). There are a 
number of reasons this could be the case. It is difficult to compare previous research on the 
subject because models and methodology used between researchers can differ; researchers often 
use varying time periods; and many studies use different units of analysis (monthly or quarterly 
data). Some of the papers discussed (Burden and Mughan 2003; and Geys and Vermeir 2008) 
fail to use robust standard errors to combat the possible heteroscedasticity of their estimates. 
Nicholson, Segura, and Woods (2002) and Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair (2013) use robust 
standard errors to combat possible heteroscedasticity; however, both papers fail to address the 
problem of fractional integration. Nicholson, Segura, and Woods (2002) do not account for the 
stationarity of their data or fractional integration. Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair (2013) do 
consider the stationarity of their data; however, by only testing the stationarity of their data using 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, and not testing for the presence of fractionally integrated data 
their findings might be the result of spurious regression (Lanier 2003, 195). Newman and 
Forechimes (2010) use error correction models so they may be controlling for heteroscedasticity; 
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however, they only account for fractional integration in their dependent variable, and not in 
every series. This is a fundamental violation of the assumption of model equivalency that 
underlies time series analyses. The use of potentially non-stationary, and fractionally integrated 
data, as well as failing to control for heteroscedasticity, could explain why prior research found 
lagged approval ratings to be statistically significant while this analysis does not. When I 
estimate both models without using Huber-White robust standard errors, many of the variables 
that are statistically insignificant in my models become statistically significant (including lagged 
approval). 
 This analysis uses econometric modeling techniques to create the aggregate-level models. 
Other alternative modeling options exist that may be considered when modeling presidential job 
approval ratings. The primary alternative is to use Autoregressive Fractionally Integrated 
Moving Average (ARFIMA) models to model presidential approval ratings. 37 This methodology 
has some strengths and weaknesses compared to the methodology used to create the aggregate-
level models in this paper. No matter what methodology is used, it is important for future 
researchers to consider not only the stationarity of their data, but also the possibility that their 
data are fractionally integrated. Given the findings reported in Table 9 and the Robinson’s 
procedure used in this analysis, it seems likely that all aggregate-level Presidential job approval 
rating data are fractionally integrated, because aggregate-level presidential job approval data are 
created by aggregating individual-level data which results in fractional dynamics in the time 
series, because the aggregate series is produced by combining individual-level series that have 
their own autoregressive and/or moving average components that describe the individuals’ 
                                                 
37 See Newman and Forchimes (2010) for an example of AFIMA models. 
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behavior being combined (Granger 1980; Lanier 2003, 193-194). Future researchers should also 
consider using different modeling techniques more suited to handling events that can cause 
exogenous shocks on presidential approval ratings. Some studies have attempted to model every 
possible event that can have an exogenous shock on presidential job approval ratings (see 
Newman and Forcehimes 2010). While this analysis does control for some of those events, it 
does not control for every possible event that could affect presidential approval ratings. 
 Given the rather low explanatory power of both models (the adjusted R was .27 and .23 
for model 1 and 2 respectively), it seems many potential explanatory factors were omitted from 
the model.38 Some of these may have been events that I missed (as noted above). Other potential 
predictors of presidential approval ratings that were left out include various international 
economy variables. As Burden and Mughan (2003) demonstrate, U.S. citizens are keenly aware 
of the international economy, and, therefore, presidential approval ratings are affected by the 
state of the international economy as it relates to the U.S. economy. 
Future aggregate-level studies should split presidential approval ratings by partisan 
identity. Gallup has data on aggregate-level presidential approval ratings by partisan identity; 
however, I was unable to access this data. Future studies benefit greatly from there data if they 
use it, because it seems likely that factors that affect presidential approval ratings may not effect 
it evenly for all partisan identities (Bond and Fleisher 2001). Perhaps executive orders do have a 
                                                 
38 Due to the large size of the 9/11 coefficient estimate, some may theorize the adjusted R-
Squared of .27, for model 1, and .23, for model 2, may be overwhelmingly due to the inclusion 
of the 9/11 terrorist attack rally-around-the-flag variable. Estimating an OLS regression of only 
the 9/11 variable on presidential approval ratings yielded an adjusted R-Squared values of .02. 
This suggest that the 9/11 variable on its own, only explains 2% of the variation in presidential 
job approval ratings.  
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statistically significant effect on presidential approval ratings when you disaggregate presidential 
approval ratings by partisan identity. To test this theory, and to prevent the ecological fallacy of 
applying aggregate-level findings on individuals, I examine two individual-level models of 
presidential approval ratings in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL MODELS 
The previous chapter has tentatively demonstrated that at aggregate-level, the number of 
executive orders issued by presidents in a given month does not affect presidential approval 
ratings. To examine how the number of executive orders a president issues affects presidential 
approval ratings at an individual-level, a pooled cross section arrangement of data from 1980 to 
2012 are constructed to specify two logistic regression models. The next section of this chapter 
examines the data and methodology used to create the two logistic regression models, including 
how the data were obtained and how it was coded. In section 4.2 I present some of the bivariate 
analysis results, followed by the results of binary logistic regression estimation of the two 
models discussed in this chapter. I then conclude by discussing how the results of this project 
differ from those of prior research. 
4.1 Data and Methodology 
Two models are estimated at the individual-level of analysis. Both models employ time 
series survey data obtained from The American National Election Studies (ANES). 39 The ANES 
time series surveys gathered data for the years 1980 through 2012.40 The ANES has survey data 
as early as 1948; however, 1980 is the first year in which questions about the national economy 
were asked in the survey. Model 1 uses data from 1980 through 2012, which yields 31,526 
                                                 
39 http://electionstudies.org/studypages/anes_timeseries_cdf/anes_timeseries_cdf.htm (accessed 
May 1, 2015) 
40 The ANES time series surveys that gathered these data from 1980 through 2012 were 
administered every two years from 1980 to 2004 (i.e., the survey years are 1980, 1982, 1984, 
etc.) In 2006 and 2010 the ANES did not conduct time series surveys. 
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unique observations.41 Similarly to the previous chapter, Model 2 uses data only through 2002, 
because Model 2’s main independent variable of interest is only salient executive orders.42 This 
yields 20,570 unique observations. By using salient and non-salient executive orders as defined 
by Howell (2005) this analysis (and the previous aggregate-level analysis) can control for issue 
salience. Issues vary over time in their salience to the public and in their impact on presidential 
approval ratings (Edwards III, Mitchel, Welch 1995, 108). Issues that are more salient to 
respondents have larger effects on presidential approval ratings than issues with less salience.  
The main dependent variable of all individual-level models (Presidential Approval) is the 
answer to a yes-or-no question asking respondents “Do you approve or disapprove of the way 
that [the president] is handling his job as President?” Because the answer to this question is 
dichotomous, binary logistic regression is used in this analysis to estimate both models; because 
the use of OLS regression for such dependent variables would likely lead to biased coefficient 
estimates (Pollock III 2012, 237). Both models are primarily differentiated by the use of two 
different executive orders variables (all executive orders, or salient executive orders only) as the 
primary independent variable of theoretical interest. Executive Orders is the count of all 
executive orders issued from August of the previous year through August of the year of the 
survey. Each ANES survey began data collection in September, so Executive Orders is the count 
of all executive orders issued over the 13-month period prior to the survey’s being 
                                                 
41 I have chosen to pool the data obtained from each year, instead of creating separate datasets 
and models for each year. See section 4.5 of this chapter for a discussion of the disadvantages 
of this method. 
42 See section 3.2 for a definition of “salient executive orders”. 
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administered.4344 Similarly, Salient Executive Orders is a count of all salient executive orders 
issued from August of the previous year through August of the year of the survey. 
With one exception (discussed below), both models incorporate the same vector of 
control variables. These include variables controlling for a respondent’s party identification 
(Party ID)45; age (Age); education (Education); gender (Gender); social class (Social Class)46; 
race (Caucasian, African American, and Hispanic)47; internal efficacy (Internal Efficacy); 
external efficacy (External Efficacy); perception of the economy in the past (Perception of the 
Economy (Past)); and outlook of how the economy will perform in the future (Perception of the 
Economy (Future)). Model 1 includes a control variable for divided government (Divided 
Government) that is not included in Model 2 due to multicollinearity issues.48 Both models also 
contain a control variable for each president’s partisan identity (President’s Party ID), and 
several carefully chosen interaction effect variables (discussed below). 
Party ID is an ordinal level variable that measures the strength of a respondent’s partisan 
identity when compared to the current president at the time of the survey. This variable has the 
following seven categories: (1) “strong opposite”; (2) “mild opposite”; (3) “weak opposite”; (4) 
“neutral” (or independent); (5) “weak same”; (6) “mild same”; and (7) “strong same.” The 
                                                 
43 This variable (Executive Orders) is mean-centered in Model 1 (discussed below). 
44 There are a number of drawbacks to coding both executive order variables this way. See the 
conclusion section of this chapter (section 4.5) for a discussion on these drawbacks. 
45 This variable is mean-centered in Model 1 (discussed below). 
46 Substituting Social Class with household income had no significant impacts on any model. 
47 Estimating the logistic regression models by excluding the Caucasian, and Hispanic 
dichotomous variables and only specifying the African-American dichotomous variable had no 
significant impacts on any model. 
48 Multicollinearity was determined by examining variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics. The 
VIF for Divided Government was over 15 in Model 2 – suggesting extreme multicollinearity 
with President’s Party ID (discussed below). 
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ANES asks respondents to place themselves on the following seven-point ideological scale: 
strong Democrat, weak Democrat, independent-leaning Democrat, Independent, independent-
leaning Republican, weak Republican, or strong Republican. To construct the Party ID variable, 
I subtracted four from the ANES seven-point ideological scale described above, and multiplied 
this variable by -1 during survey years in which the president is a Democrat, and by positive one 
when the president was a Republican. If Expected Finding 5.1 is theoretically valid I expect to 
find evidence indicating that as Party ID increases the likelihood of an individual approving of 
the way the president is handling his job as president increases, ceteris paribus.  
Model 1 also contains an interaction effect variable created by multiplying Executive 
Orders and Party ID. I included this interaction effect variable because, theoretically, executive 
orders may have different effects on respondents’ approval of the president when they are more 
closely aligned with the president’s partisan identity (as measured by Party ID), than when they 
are more distant from the President’s partisan identity.49 By estimating this interaction effect, 
multicollinearity was introduced into Model 1. It is important to remove the multicollinearity 
from the specified equation, because multicollinearity may bias the estimates; therefore, I 
removed the multicollinearity in the model by mean-centering Executive Orders and Party 
ID.5051 Then, I recreated the interaction effect variable from the newly-centered variables and 
                                                 
49 This variable is not available in Model 2, because an interaction of Salient Executive Orders 
and Party ID was found to be statistically insignificant when estimating Model 2 and including 
the interaction effect variable in the model did not increase its level of statistical significance. 
50 Mean centering is the act of subtracting the mean from the variable. Mean centering (or 
standardizing) a variable is a common technique to avoid multicollinearity between interaction 
effect variables, and the variables that are used to create the interaction effect variable (Aiken 
and West 1991). 
51 It should be noted that Party ID is a discreet variable and an unpublished pdf document from 
Williams (2015) cautions readers to only mean center continuous variables. 
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specified only the mean-centered variables in Model 1. Doing so allows me to keep all three 
variables without adversely affecting the model estimation (Aiken and West 1991). 
Age is a standard interval-level control variable that measures a respondent’s age.52 
Education is an ordinal-level control variable that measures the highest level of education that a 
respondent has obtained, with the following four categories: (1) grade school or less; (2) high 
school; (3) some college (but no degree); and (4) college or advanced degree. Gender is a 
standard control variable; however, it is also used to test the validity of Expected Finding 5.4. It 
is a dichotomous variable coded such that female respondents are coded one (1), and male 
respondents are coded zero (0). Social Class is an eight category ordinal-level variable that 
controls for a respondent’s wealth by controlling for their social class. The categories are as 
follows: (0) lower class; (1) average working; (2) working; (3) upper working; (4) average 
middle; (5) middle class; (6) upper middle; and (7) upper class. 
A respondent’s race is specified in the models by the following three dichotomous race 
variables: Caucasian, African American, and Hispanic. As the variable names suggest, each race 
variable is coded one (1) if the respondent belongs to that race (Caucasian, African American, or 
Hispanic), and zero (0) otherwise.53 Internal Efficacy measures a respondent’s internal level of 
political efficacy. The ANES ask respondents if they agree with or disagree with the following 
question: “sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t 
really understand what’s going on.” Internal Efficacy is coded one (1) when a respondent 
                                                 
52 Age intervals range include 1-99, and 100 or over. 
53 These race dummy variables were chosen because Caucasian, African American, and Hispanic 
respondents were the most commonly identified races of respondents in the survey (99% of the 
surveyed respondents identified themselves as Caucasian, African American, or Hispanic). 
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disagrees with the question, and zero (0) when the respondent agrees with the question. External 
Efficacy controls for a respondent’s external level of efficacy. The ANES also ask respondents: 
“how much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is 
right?” The ANES then coded responses to this question following this metric: (1) none of the 
time/never; (2) some of the time; (3) most of the time; (4) just about always; and (9) don’t know 
or depends. To code external efficacy (External Efficacy) I recoded the original measure that the 
ANES employed into a four-category, ordinal-level variable with respondents who answered do 
not know or depends recoded as missing; thus, higher categories in the variable denote higher 
levels of absolute trust in the government to do what is right. 
Perception of the Economy (Past) is a control variable used to control for a respondent’s 
perception of how the economy has performed in the past and to test the validity of Expected 
Finding 5.2. The ANES ask respondents to answer the following question: “Would you say that 
over the past year the nation’s economy has gotten better, stayed the same or gotten worse?” 
Respondent responses are then coded as missing, better, stayed same, or worse. To code 
Perception of the Economy (Past) I recoded the variable discussed above into a three-category, 
ordinal-level variable such that worse was coded negative one (-1), stayed the same was coded 
zero (0), and better was coded one (1). This variable controls for both the national economy, and 
respondents’ knowledge about how the economy is performing. Perception of the Economy 
(Future) is very similar to Perception of the Economy (Past); however, as the variable name 
suggests, Perception of the Economy (Future) asks respondents about how they believe the 
economy will perform in the next year. It is coded negative one (-1) when respondent’s believe 
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the economy will perform worse, zero (0) when they believe the economy will stay about the 
same, and one (1) when they believe the economy will perform better. 
Model 1 also includes a variable (Divided Government) to control for periods of divided 
government. Divided Government is a dichotomous variable that is coded one (1) during survey 
years in which either chamber of Congress’ majority party are not that of the president; it is 
coded zero (0) otherwise. As mentioned above, and described in further detail below, this 
variable is not specified in Model 2 because it had to be excluded to avoid multicollinearity. 
Both models also contain a variable (President’s Party ID) to control for the current president’s 
(at the time of the survey administration) party affiliation. President’s Party ID is coded one (1) 
when the president belongs the Republican Party; and zero (0) otherwise.54 Both models also 
contain a Gender and President’s Party ID interaction effect variable that is used to test the 
validity of Expected Finding 5.4. To create this variable I simply multiplied Gender by 
President’s Party ID. 
Model 1 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 = ?̂? + ?̂?1(𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠) + ?̂?2(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝐷) +
 ?̂?3(𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝐷) + ?̂?4(𝐴𝑔𝑒) + ?̂?5(𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + ?̂?6(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟) +
?̂?7(𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠) + ?̂?8(𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛) + ?̂?9(𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛) + ?̂?10(𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐) +
?̂?11(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑦) + ?̂?12(𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑦) +
?̂?13(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡) + ?̂?14(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) +
?̂?15(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡
′𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝐷) + ?̂?16(𝐷𝑖𝑣_𝐺𝑜𝑣) + ?̂?17(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑃𝐼𝐷) +  𝑒  
                                                 
54 I coded the dummy variable such that Republican presidents were coded 1, because 
Republican presidents were in office during 55% of the surveyed years. 
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Model 2 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 = ?̂? + ?̂?1(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠) + ?̂?2(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝐷) + ?̂?3(𝐴𝑔𝑒) +
?̂?4(𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + ?̂?5(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟) + ?̂?6(𝑆𝐸𝑆) + ?̂?7(𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛) + ?̂?8(𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛) +
?̂?9(𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐) + ?̂?10(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑦) + ?̂?11(𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑦) +
?̂?12(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡) + ?̂?13(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) +
?̂?14(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡
′𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝐷) + ?̂?15(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑃𝐼𝐷) + 𝑒  
4.2 Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analysis 
Table 12 (see Appendix B) contains a number of descriptive statistics for the following 
variables: Presidential Approval; Executive Orders; Salient Executive Orders; Party ID; Age; 
Education; Gender; SES; all three race variables; Internal Efficacy; External Efficacy; 
Perception of the Economy (Past); Perception of the Economy (Future); President’s Party ID; 
and Divided Government. The mean of Presidential Approval is .55 suggesting that 55 percent of 
respondents approved of the way the president (at the time) handled their job. The minimum 
number of executive orders issued in this study (Carter-Obama) was thirty-one by President 
George W. Bush. The highest number of executive orders issued in this study was 82 by 
President Reagan. Executive orders that were reported on by the N.Y. Times, and, thus, 
considered salient executive orders, were issued less often, having a minimum of zero and a 
maximum of five salient executive orders issued in a given thirteen month period. 
Table 13 provides descriptive statistics on the number of respondents in each survey year, 
the number of all executive orders and salient executive orders issued in the 13 month period 
prior to the start of each survey, and the type of government (unified or divided) at the time of 
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each survey. As can be seen from the tables, 714 executive orders were issued in total, but only 
26 salient executive orders were issued, and divided government was present in twelve out of the 
fifteen years that the surveys covered. 
Table 14 (see Appendix B) depicts the relationship between mean Presidential Approval 
and Executive Orders. The table seems to indicate no relationship at all between Presidential 
Approval and Executive Orders, and does not support Hypothesis 1. Conducting a Pearson’s r 
correlation indicates no statistically significant relationship exist between the two variables with 
a correlation of 0.00.55  
Table 15 provides slightly clearer evidence as to the validity of Hypothesis 2; however, it 
fails to find any notable support for the hypothesis. Table 15 depicts the relationship between 
mean Presidential Approval and Salient Executive Orders with a mean-comparison analysis. 
Table 15 seemingly indicate a weak negative relationship between the amount of salient 
executive orders issued and approval of the president. 
As expected Expected Finding 5.1 finds statistical support from the results listed in Table 
16. Table 16 reports the results from a mean-comparison analysis between Presidential Approval 
and Party ID. Each one unit change in Party ID corresponds to higher mean Presidential 
Approval. This shows a strong positive relationship between the two variables, which is 
consistent with the findings of Bond and Fleisher (2001) and Lebo and Cassino (2007). Tables 
17 and 18 provided credible support for Expected Finding 5.2, consistent with the findings of 
Bond and Fleisher (2001) and Clarke et al. (2005). Table 17 is a mean-comparison analysis 
                                                 
55 This finding is not statistically significant, because the two-tailed significance was 0.935. See 
Appendix B and Table 21 for all Pearson’s r correlations of variables relevant to the five 
individual-level hypotheses. 
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between Perception of the Economy (Past) and Presidential Approval, and a mean-comparison 
analysis between Perception of the Economy (Future) and Presidential Approval. In both tables, 
one unit changes in Perception of the Economy (Past) and Perception of the Economy (Future) 
are associated with higher mean approval ratings for the president. A mean-comparison analysis 
of divided government and presidential approval ratings (Table 18 in Appendix B) finds some 
credible support for Expected Finding 5.3. The mean of Presidential Approval is higher during 
times of divided government than it is during times of unified government. Expected Finding 5.4 
finds some support consistent with the theoretical expectations of Expected Finding 5.4. Gender 
and Presidential Approval, while controlling for a president’s party affiliation (see Table 19 in 
Appendix B), yielded results indicating a statistically significant difference of .05 in mean 
approval ratings between genders. 
4.3 Logistic Regression Results 
The results of both models can be found in Table 20 located in Appendix B.56 Executive 
Orders is statistically insignificant in Model 1; however, the interaction effect variable for 
Executive Orders and Party ID is statistically significant. Table 21 reports the predicted 
probability of a respondent approving of the president when all variables are held at their mean, 
median, or modal values (where appropriate)57 – excluding Executive Orders and Party ID which 
                                                 
56 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores are included in Table 20 to test for multicollinearity. All 
scores are less than 10 (and most less than 5) suggesting that multicollinearity is not present in 
either model after mean-centering Executive Orders, Party ID, and their interaction effect 
variable in Model 1 (Kennedy 1985; and Hair et al. 1995). 
57 Variables are held at their mean when they are measured at an interval-level, their median 
when they are measured at an ordinal-level, and their modal value when they are measured at a 
nominal-level. 
59 
 
are allowed to vary. Table 21 provides partial evidence as to the validity of Hypothesis 1. As the 
number of executive orders issued increases, the predicted probability of a respondent approving 
of the president decreases for respondents that identify as being strongly aligned with the 
president’s partisan identity (Party ID=7); however, as the number of executive orders issued 
increases the predicted probability of respondents identifying as being strongly opposite of the 
president’s partisan identity (Party ID=1), increases. This is inconsistent with my theory and 
Hypothesis 3.58 Table 21 reports these results despite the fact that Executive Orders is not 
statistically significant, because its interaction with Party ID is statistically significant and 
because the interaction effect variable has a negative coefficient estimate. Not surprisingly, 
Tables 20 and 21 provide evidence as to the validity of Expected Finding 5.1 for both models. 
Party ID is statistically significant and its coefficient estimate is positively consistent with my 
theoretical expectations. The predicted probability of a respondent’s approving of the president is 
much higher when a respondent is classified as “strong same” for every level or number of 
executive orders issued than it is at all other values of Party ID, as evidenced by Tables 21 and 
22. 
Similar to Table 21, Table 22 notes the predicted probability of a respondent approving 
of the president when all variables are held at their mean, median, or modal values (where 
appropriate), excluding Salient Executive Orders and Party ID which are allowed to vary. Salient 
executive orders is statistically significant and has a negative parameter estimates. This suggest, 
and as Table 22 demonstrates, that as the number of salient executive orders issued increases, the 
probability of a respondent’s approving of the president decreases, ceteris paribus, consistent 
                                                 
58 The implications of this finding are discussed in the conclusion section of this chapter. 
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with Hypothesis 3.  Consistent with Expected Finding 5.2, and the reported findings of Bond and 
Fleisher (2001) and Clarke et al. (2005), Perception of the Economy (Past) and Perception of the 
Economy (Future) are statistically significant and their coefficients are in the expected direction 
(positive) for both models. Respondents who believe the economy is now performing better than 
it actually was over the last year are significantly more likely to approve of the president than are 
respondents who believe the economy has been performing worse that it was over the last year. 
Similarly, respondents who believe the economy will perform better in the next twelve months 
(Perception of the Economy (Future)) are more likely to approve of the president, than are those 
respondents who believe the economy will perform worse in the next twelve months. 
Consistent with Expected Finding 5.3 and the findings of Nicholson, Segura, and Woods 
(2002), Divided Government is positive and statistically significant in Model 1. During times of 
divided government, respondents are more likely to approve of the president than they are during 
times of unified government. Contrary to the results of Clarke et al. (2005), and other literature 
reporting a gender gap, I do not find support for Expected Finding 5.4 in either model. Table 23 
reports the predicted probabilities of approving of the president when all other variables – 
excluding Gender and President’s Party ID – are held at their mean, or median (where 
appropriate). Table 23 reports the probability of a respondent’s approving of a Republican 
president is roughly the same for both genders, and females are equally likely to approve of 
Democratic presidents or Republic presidents. The predicted probability of a female respondent’s 
approving of a Democratic president is slightly higher than the predicted probability of a male 
respondent approving of a Democratic president; however, this slight difference is not consistent 
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with Expected Finding 5.4, because Table 23 reports both genders are more likely to approve of 
Republican presidents than Democratic presidents. 
Interestingly, age and education have negative signed coefficient estimates in both 
models. This suggest that the probability of a respondent’s approving of the president decreases 
as age increases. Similarly, the probability of a respondents’ approving of the president 
decreases as education increases. Social Class and all three race control variables are statistically 
insignificant in both models. Suggesting that the likelihood of a respondent approving of the 
president is not affected by a respondent’s social class or race when controlling for all of the 
other variables in the models. This finding may suggest that controlling for respondent’s social 
class and race are unnecessary when data are properly weighted.59 The internal efficacy variable 
has an unexpectedly negative coefficient. This finding suggest that respondents who think the 
government is too complicated to understand are more likely to approve of the president than 
respondents who do not think the government is too complicated to understand. The external 
efficacy variable has the expected coefficient estimate sign (positive) and is statistically 
significant. Both efficacy variables have a statistically significant effect on presidential approval 
ratings, but most presidential approval studies do not include controls for these variables. Most 
studies that do contain both of these variables usually pertain to voting, and not approval of 
presidents.60 
                                                 
59 The ANES over-sampled and under-sampled some portions of the national population during 
different survey years. To combat this problem the ANES provides researchers with an 
appropriate weight variable to weigh the dataset with. Failing to weigh data correctly, or not at 
all, may cause the researcher to report spurious estimates. 
60 For an example of a presidential approval study that does specify external efficacy as a 
variable, see Ostrom and Simon (1985). 
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4.4 Conclusion 
The results of logistic regression estimation yielded evidence to partially support 
Hypothesis 1 and 3, and fully support Hypothesis 2. At an individual-level salient executive 
orders had a negative statistically significant effect on presidential approval ratings for members 
of both political parties. As the number of salient executive orders issued increases, the 
probability of a respondent approving of the president decreases accordingly, ceteris paribus. 
This finding holds for salient executive orders no matter which political party a respondent 
belongs to; however when the type of executive order is non-salient this finding only holds for 
members belonging to the same political party as the president. The amount of non-salient 
executive orders issued actually increased the predicted probability of respondents approving of 
the president when those respondents identified as being strongly opposite of the president’s 
partisan identity (Party ID=1). This anomalous finding is inconsistent with Hypothesis 1 and 3, 
and at present, I have no theoretical reason for this finding. 
The finding that salient executive orders had a statistically significant effect on 
presidential approval ratings at an individual-level warrants future studies to fully explore this 
relationship. The individual-level models used in this chapter may suffer from a few design 
problems that may be causes for some concern, and future studies may address these issues. One 
cause for concern is the lack of fixed-effect variables in this model (Stimson 1985). By pooling 
the data, I am unable to control for time period effects within the data without the use of fixed 
effect variables; however, due to multicollinearity all fixed effect variables that were initially 
included in this study had to be eliminated from the models. Because of this, these models are 
63 
 
unable to control for wars, rally-around-the-flag-effects, scandals, election years, and more. The 
results of this paper may not be generalizable accordingly. 
The use of pooling data “have become increasingly common in political science and 
other social sciences”; however there are alternative methods that may be better (Lebo and 
Weber 2015, 242). One such method that is beyond the scope of this paper is to use an 
autoregressive fractionally integrated moving average (ARFIMA) model, and a multi-level 
model (MLM) to deal with autocorrelation at the aggregate and individual-levels (Lebo and 
Weber 2015, 242-243).” This paper uses two different datasets for the aggregate and individual-
level models. Using the more advanced modeling techniques described above, only one dataset 
would be required that could be used to estimate both individual and aggregate-level models. 
Doing so, a researcher could use a series of cross section surveys taken over time to model 
individual-level effects while controlling for time-varying relationships. Unfortunately, the 
logistic regression models estimated in this chapter cannot control for time-varying relationships 
at an individual-level due to be pooled. 
The executive order variables used in this chapter may also be some cause for concern. 
By using ANES cross-sectional data and pooling multiple datasets over time, both executive 
order variables do not have a high amount of variation. This is because each variable is the same 
for every respondent in a survey year, and with only fifteen survey years this does not yield 
much variation in the variable. Future studies that expand the impact that executive orders has on 
presidential approval should use monthly data instead of yearly data. Doing so may yield more 
variation in a variable that counts the number of executive orders issued by presidents. Because 
of the low variation in each executive order variable, both models had difficulty in distinguishing 
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each variable from other fixed effect variables. This may have been what caused 
multicollinearity in the initial models that estimated fixed effect control variables. By using 
ANES surveys, the logistic regression models estimated in this chapter are able to control for 
individual-level factors that other surveys may not be able to control for, such as perceptions 
about the economy and political efficacy; however, while this chapter demonstrates respondent’s 
perceptions about the economy and political efficacy have a statistically significant effect on 
presidential approval ratings; the benefits of using ANES data may not outweigh some of the 
limitations mentioned here. 
This study failed to find evidence of a gender-gap in presidential approval ratings. This 
may be because of the time period excluded from this study. Of the fifteen surveys that make up 
the pooled dataset, nine of the survey years included Republican presidents. The disparity 
between the amount of Republican and Democratic presidents, and the abnormally low approval 
ratings for President Carter may be the cause for this study failing to find evidence to support 
Expected Finding 5.4. Using survey data that predates 1980 may leave a researcher to find 
evidence of the gender gap in presidential approval data. Clarke et al. (2005) find that the gender 
gap between men and women’s approval of the president is due to the way men and women 
differ in their economic evaluations. This study finds that a gender gap does not exist when 
controlling for individual-level factors such as partisan identity, race, political efficacy, and 
education, or aggregate-level factors such as divided government. Clarke et al. (2005) control for 
fixed effects such as scandals and wars, but do not control for the variables mentioned above. 
This finding suggest that there may be homogeneity between men and women in the forces 
driving presidential approval ratings. 
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Some may, correctly, argue that by pooling data from 1980-2012 I am limiting my results 
by assuming that the effect of variables over time are going to remain constant. A possible 
solution to this problem would be to pool the data around individual presidencies.61 Doing so 
should allow the effects of variables to change over time instead of remaining constant from 
1980-2012. Pooling the data around individual-presidencies using the same variables62 did allow 
some variables change over time. In every model created, twelve in total (two for each 
presidency), African American was statistically significant. For Democratic presidents African 
American was positively signed, and for Republic presidents African American was negatively 
signed. This finding suggested that African American respondents were more likely to approve 
of Democratic presidents than they were of Republican presidents, not a terribly surprising 
finding. This finding differs greatly from the finding of the 1980-2012 pooled data, however, in 
which African American was statistically insignificant. Gender had a positive coefficient sign 
and was statistically significant during the Carter and Clinton models. For all other models, 
Gender was statistically insignificant. This finding is not inconsistent with my original findings 
because Gender was statistically insignificant for all but four models. 
Consistent with my original findings, in every model salient executive orders had a 
statistically significant negative effect on presidential approval ratings. Executive Orders varied 
                                                 
61 Carter (1980), Reagan (1982-1988), Bush (1990-1992), Clinton (1994-2000), G. W. Bush 
(2002-2008), and Obama (2012). 
62 Creating separate models and datasets for each presidency restricted me from using the divided 
government, president party affiliation, and gender interaction variables. Divided government 
was a constant in every model except the Clinton and G.W. Bush models; however, including 
it in those two models cause extreme multicollinearity. Similarly, the president’s party 
affiliation would be a constant in every model, and because of this the gender and president’s 
party affiliation interaction variable had to be dropped from every model. 
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between each model. For Carter, Executive Orders had a statistically significant negative effect 
on presidential approval ratings; however, the interaction effect variable for a respondent’s party 
affiliation and the number of executive orders issued had to be dropped from the model due to 
extreme multicollinearity.63 For Reagan, the numbers of executive orders issued were not 
statistically significant; however, the interaction effect variable for Executive Orders and Party 
ID had a positive coefficient and was statistically significant. Similarly to Carter, the Bush 
models had to drop the Executive Orders and Party ID interaction effect variable. By doing so, 
Executive Orders were found to have a statistically significant positive impact on presidential job 
approval ratings. Similarly to Reagan, for Clinton executive orders were not statistically 
significant; however, the interaction effect variable for Executive Orders and Party ID had a 
positive coefficient and was statistically significant. Similarly to Carter and Bush, in the G. W. 
Bush and Obama models the interaction between Executive Orders and Party ID had to be 
dropped. For both models Executive Orders had a statistically significant negative effect on 
presidential approval ratings. 
While it is true pooling data into models for each presidency allowed some variables to 
differ over time (African American, Gender, and Executive Orders), and even led to somewhat 
different results, these results are suspect due to a number of issues I encountered when 
generating the models for each president. The models discussed above were plagued by 
multicollinearity issues, and many of the interaction effect variables had to be dropped 
accordingly. I was unable to include the divided government variable in any model (including 
                                                 
63 Interestingly, mean centering both variables (Executive Orders and Party ID) did not reduce 
the VIF scores of any of the three variables. 
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the Clinton and G. W. Bush. models) due to multicollinearity. In eight of the models that I 
estimated, I had to drop the constant term from the model, because if I did not my executive 
orders variables would be dropped from the model. This occurred because in four models (Carter 
and Obama) the Executive Orders and Significant Executive Orders variables were constant and 
did not have any variation between respondents; the matrix was thus singular. Similarly, in the 
rest of the models (Reagan-G.W. Bush) the amount of variation in Executive Orders and 
Significant Executive Orders was extremely low.  This lack of variation likely caused the 
multicollinearity issues discussed above. 
Even if the individual-presidency models results were not suspect due to the issues 
discussed above, they would still only be specific to individual presidents, and therefore not 
generalizable. Pooling the data from 1980-2012 is not ideal, because it necessitates that the 
effects of variables do not change over time; however, for the purpose of testing the effects of 
executive orders on presidential approval ratings it is a better solution than pooling data around 
each presidents time in office. This is the better solution for three reasons: first, it allowed a 
greater amount of variation in the executive orders variables than pooling data around each 
presidency; second, the 1980-2012 pooled data were not plagued by issues with 
multicollinearity; third, the 1980-2012 pooled models were able to control for times of divided 
and unified government. 
There are a few key implications from the results discovered in this chapter. Besides, the 
need for future research to look at how issuing presidents issuing executive orders affect their 
approval ratings, future presidential approval models, at an individual-level, should consider 
adding internal and external efficacy control variables. This chapter has tentatively demonstrated 
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that a respondent’s level of external political efficacy is positively associated with higher 
presidential approval, and a respondent’s level of internal political efficacy is negatively 
associated with higher presidential approval. If this finding is theoretically valid, then omitting 
political efficacy variables may cause a researcher to report spurious estimates due to omitted 
variable bias. This thesis chapter highlights the need for proper data collection or data weighing. 
Variables controlling for a respondent’s race and social class were statistically insignificant. This 
finding implies that respondent’s probability of approving of the president is not affected by their 
race or social class. Studies that find race and social class variables to be statistically significant 
may suffer from over or under survey sampling, and may not be properly weighing their data. 
The next chapter highlights the major overall findings of this thesis and discusses the 
implications of these findings for future research. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
In Chapter 3, two OLS regression fixed-effect models were estimated at an aggregate-
level. Both models employ monthly data, beginning in January 1953; however, due to the data 
limitations previously discussed (in Chapter 3), Model 1 includes data through 2012, and Model 
2 only includes data through 2002. Both models employ Gallup survey data, and both models 
control for several variables: previous monthly presidential job approval ratings; the strength of 
the economy; the occurrence of divided government; the presence or absence of honeymoon 
periods; scandals; wars; and period effects during each respective president’s administration. 
Model 1 did not find support for Hypothesis 1. At an aggregate-level, issuing executive orders 
did not have any significant effect on presidential job approval ratings. When controlling for the 
issue saliency of executive orders, Model 2 fails to find support for Hypothesis 2. At an 
aggregate-level, issuing salient executive orders did not significantly impact on presidential job 
approval ratings. 
Chapter 4 constructed a pooled cross-section arrangement of data from 1980 to 2012, 
using data obtained from The American National Election Study Surveys, to specify two binary 
logistic regression models. Both models controlled for the following variables: respondent’s 
party identification, age, education, gender, social class, race, internal political efficacy, external 
political efficacy, perception of the economy past performance; and outlook of how the economy 
will perform in the future. Model 1 also included a control variable for divided government; and 
both models contained a control variable for each president’s partisan identity and several 
carefully chosen interaction effect variables. Model 1 reports that the number of non-salient 
executive orders issued actually increased the predicted probability of respondents’ approving of 
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the president when those respondents identified as being strong Democrat and the president was 
a Republican, or when respondents identified as being strong Republican when the president was 
a Democrat. This finding is anomalous and contradictory to my theory and hypotheses. 
Consistent with my theory and hypotheses, when respondents identified as being strongly 
aligned with the president’s partisan identity, increasing numbers of non-salient executive orders 
decreased the predicted probability of respondents approving of the president. Also consistent 
with my theory and hypotheses, Model 2 reports that, at an individual-level, salient executive 
orders had a negative statistically significant impact on presidential approval ratings for members 
of both political parties. As the number of salient executive orders issued increases, the 
probability of a respondent approving of the president decreases accordingly, ceteris paribus. 
These seemingly-contradictory findings between both sets of models can be explained by 
the differences between the two models. By specifying a series of dummy variables that 
represent when each respective president was in office, the aggregate-level (fixed effect) models 
are able to control for period effects during each presidents administration; however they are 
unable to control for individual-level factors that affect presidential approval ratings. The 
individual-level models have demonstrated that partisan affiliation, perceptions about the 
economy’s retrospective and prospective performance, age, education, and levels of internal and 
external efficacy affect presidential approval ratings.  
Respondents who share the same party affiliation as the president were statistically more 
likely to approve of the president’s job performance, than were respondents not sharing the same 
party affiliation as the president. Respondents who believed the economy performed well in the 
past, and respondents who believed the economy will perform better in the future were 
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statistically more likely to approve of the president’s job performance than were respondents 
who believed the economy performed poorly in the past and respondents who believed the 
economy will get worse in the future. Age was demonstrated to have a negative effect on 
presidential approval ratings. As age increased, the probability of a respondent’s approving of 
the president decreased accordingly. Similarly, as education levels increased, the probability of a 
respondent’s approving of the president decreased. Internal political efficacy levels had a 
negative effect on presidential approval ratings, suggesting that respondents who think the 
government is too complicated to understand are more likely to approve of the president than 
respondents who do not think the government is too complicated to understand. External political 
efficacy levels were demonstrated to have a positive effect on presidential approval ratings. 
Respondents who believed the government would do what is right were statistically more likely 
to approve of the president’s job performance, than were respondents who had less faith in the 
government to do what is right. Thus, the respondent’s levels of political efficaciousness had 
significant impacts on the approval ratings they report. 
The aggregate-level models are weakened by a researcher’s not accounting for the 
vari0ables discussed above. However, while the individual-level models are able to control for 
the variables discussed above, due to the multicollinearity issues, that prevented the specification 
of fixed-effect variables, they are unable to control for the same period effects that the aggregate-
level models are able to control for. This shortcoming is not ideal, and it may lower the 
generalizability of the individual-level model results. Future researchers, using the methods 
described in the previous chapter, may wish to consider including fixed-effect control variables 
in their models. Doing so allows researchers to ensure their models are more robust than models 
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that do not included fixed-effect control variables. Despite the lack of fixed-effects in the 
individual-level models, I believe the individual-level models may be a better theoretical 
explanation of presidential approval ratings. I believe this to be the case because the aggregate-
level models may suffer from omitted variable bias due the absence of the variables discussed 
above. 
Presidential approval ratings are read in Washington and considered approximate to 
reality (Gronke and Newman 2003, 501). Higher approval ratings tend to pay of electorally for 
the president and his party in Congress and “also affect the president’s policy-making goals, 
legislative strategy, and success in promoting his agenda” (Gronke and Newman 2003, 501).64 
This impact occurs because presidential approval ratings are a political resource that presidents 
and their advisors hope to influence through strategic action (McAvoy 2008, 284).65 If the 
finding that the president’s issuing executive orders has a negative effect on presidential job 
approval ratings is theoretically valid, as the individual-level models suggest, then the 
ramifications of this finding on presidents and future presidential research are indicative of a 
structural link in the president’s performance ratings. Like all decisions presidents make, 
presidents must think strategically when planning to issue executive orders, because issuing 
executive orders that are salient to the public has been demonstrated to have a negative effect on 
                                                 
64 See also: Sigelman (1979); Newman and Ostrom (2002); and Gronke, Koch, and Wilson 
(2003). 
65 See also: Bond and Fleisher (1990); Bond, Fleisher, and Wood (2003); and Jacobs and Shapiro 
(1994). 
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presidential approval ratings, ceteris paribus; and even non-salient executive orders may lead the 
president to receive lower presidential approval ratings from some members of the public.66 
Future presidential approval research that attempts to model approval ratings may wish to 
include a variable for executive orders. Newman and Forcehimes (2010) implore researchers to 
use their list of significant presidential events because it provides for consistent comparison 
across studies and because their selection of events is ostensibly unbiased. I implore researchers 
to include Howell’s (2003, 2005) list of significant (salient) executive orders and treat the 
issuance of salient executive orders as significant presidential events. Doing so may significantly 
enhance the explanatory power of future models. I do not advise researchers to model non-
significant executive orders in a similar manner as presidential events; however, researchers 
should include counts of non-significant executive orders in their models, because they were 
demonstrated to have significant effects on approval ratings at an individual-level. 
This thesis has found two significant findings that differ from prior research. Chapter 3 
demonstrated that past monthly presidential approval ratings do not significantly affect current 
presidential approval ratings. This finding is contrary to past research (Nicholson, Segura, and 
Woods 2002; Burden and Mughan 2003; Geys and Vermeir 2008; Newman and Forcehimes 
2010; Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair 2013). The use of potentially non-stationary, and 
fractionally integrated data, as well as failing to control for heteroscedasticity, could explain why 
prior research found lagged approval ratings to be statistically significant while this analysis does 
not. This thesis has failed to find evidence of a gender-gap in presidential approval ratings. There 
                                                 
66 As previously discussed, it was demonstrated in Chapter 4 that non-salient executive orders 
had a negative effect on respondents belonging to the same political affiliation as the president. 
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are a few reasons that could explain why this study did not find evidence of a gender-gap. It is 
possible that a gender-gap does not exist when examining the time period used by the individual-
level models. It is also possible the disparity between the amount of Republican and Democratic 
presidents, and the abnormally low approval ratings for President Carter may be the underlying 
reason for this study’s failing to find evidence of a gender-gap. Of course, it is also possible that 
a gender gap does not exist when controlling for individual-level factors such as partisan 
identity, race, political efficacy, and education, or aggregate-level factors such as divided 
government. 
This thesis has also demonstrated the need for future researchers to include control 
variables for individual’s levels of efficaciousness. Chapter 4 has tentatively demonstrated that a 
respondent’s level of external political efficacy is positively associated with higher presidential 
approval, and a respondent’s level of internal political efficacy is negatively associated with 
higher presidential approval. Omitting political efficacy variables may cause a researcher to 
report spurious estimates due to omitted variable bias, and including political efficacy control 
variables should enhance the explanatory power of future models. 
This thesis has demonstrated that president’s issuing of executive orders has a significant 
effect on the approval ratings they receive from individuals. When the executive order issued is 
salient to the public, presidents can expect to receive lower presidential approval ratings from 
individuals. This finding is consistent why my theory and hypotheses, and is consistent with the 
assumptions of Mayer and Price (2002) and Ouyang (2012). Even non-salient executive orders 
were found to have a negative impact on the approval ratings presidents receive from members 
of their own party.  
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Reeves and Rogowski (2016a, 2016b), and this paper, are important first steps in 
advancing literature on how unilateral power use impacts approval ratings, and how the public 
reacts to the use of unilateral powers. Reeves and Rogowski (2016a) has demonstrated that 
support for unilateral power use is low. They report this finding by conducting six nationally 
representative surveys that ask respondents if they agree or disagree with the exercising of 
unilateral power by presidents under varying circumstances. Similarly, Reeves and Rogowski 
(2016b) use nationally representative surveys to measure support for hypothetical presidential 
candidates. The authors report that candidates that pledge to achieve their policy goals through 
unilateral power use receive consistently lower approval ratings than candidates that pledge to 
achieve their policy goals through congressional legislation.  
While the research of Reeves and Rogowski (2016a, 2016b) advance the literature in 
theoretically interesting ways, the authors admit the research designs they conducted do not 
empirically test the effects the president’s use of unilateral power has on the approval ratings 
they receive in real-world instances of unilateral power use. This thesis does empirically test the 
effects the president’s issuing of executive orders has on the approval ratings they receive. 
Future researcher may wish to improve on the models discussed in this thesis to more rigorously 
test the significant relationship found between the president’s issuing of executive orders and the 
subsequent approval ratings they receive.   
76 
 
APPENDIX A: CHAPTER 3 TABLES AND FIGURES 
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Table 1. Aggregate-Level Data Descriptive Statistics 1953-2012 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Presidential Approval1 719 23.00 88.00 54.27 
Executive Orders 720 0.00 19.00 4.37 
Salient Executive 
Orders 588 0.00 4.00 0.28 
Stock Market Index 720 23.27 1539.66 437.19 
Consumer Price Index 720 26.50 231.40 103.20 
Unemployment 720 2.50 10.80 5.93 
Percent Change Stock 
Market Index 720 -20.39% 12.02% 0.62% 
Percent Change 
Consumer Price Index 720 -1.91% 1.80% 0.29% 
1Source: Gallup Survey Data. 
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Table 2. A Frequency Distribution of all Executive Orders 1953-2012 
The number of 
Executive Orders 
Issued in a Month1 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
0 15 2.1 2.1 2.1 
1 58 8.1 8.1 10.1 
2 116 16.1 16.1 26.3 
3 118 16.4 16.4 42.6 
4 109 15.1 15.1 57.8 
5 104 14.4 14.4 72.2 
6 70 9.7 9.7 81.9 
7 49 6.8 6.8 88.8 
8 31 4.3 4.3 93.1 
9 19 2.6 2.6 95.7 
10 12 1.7 1.7 97.4 
11 9 1.3 1.3 98.6 
12 3 .4 .4 99.0 
13 1 .1 .1 99.2 
14 2 .3 .3 99.4 
16 1 .1 .1 99.6 
17 1 .1 .1 99.7 
18 1 .1 .1 99.9 
19 1 .1 .1 100.0 
Total 720 100.0 100.0   
1Source Howell (2005). 
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Table 3. A Frequency Distribution of Salient Executive Orders 1953-2002 
The number of 
Salient Executive 
Orders Issued in a 
Month1 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
0 457 63.5 77.7 77.7 
1 105 14.6 17.9 95.6 
2 20 2.8 3.4 99 
3 5 0.7 0.9 99.8 
4 1 0.1 0.2 100 
Total 588 100 100   
1Source: Howell (2005). 
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Figure 1. How Presidential Approval Ratings are Affected by Executive Orders 1953-2012 
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Table 4. Mean Presidential Job Approval Ratings by the Number of Executive Orders 
Issued 1953-2012 
Executive 
Orders1 
Mean N Std. 
Deviation 
0 53.45 15 13.407 
1 53.97 58 11.053 
2 54.4 116 11.579 
3 52.12 118 11.773 
4 54.59 109 12.567 
5 53.75 104 12.515 
6 56.42 70 12.846 
7 54.47 49 12.583 
8 52.24 31 12.572 
9 57.76 19 10.672 
10 59.53 12 17.638 
11 53.07 8 13.175 
12 53 3 10.817 
13 54 1 . 
14 68.5 2 23.335 
16 70 1 . 
17 67.75 1 . 
18 77 1 . 
19 45.75 1 . 
Total 54.27 719 12.296 
1Source: Howell (2005). 
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Figure 2. How Presidential Approval Ratings are Affected by Salient Executive Orders 
1953-2012  
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Table 5. Mean Presidential Job Approval Ratings by the Number of Salient Executive 
Orders Issued 1953-2002 
Salient 
Executive 
Orders1 
Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation 
0 55.03 457 11.89 
1 57.15 104 11.542 
2 61.7 20 10.255 
3 61.2 5 12.513 
4 72 1 . 
Total 55.71 587 11.856 
1Source: Howell (2005). 
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Table 6. Presidential Job Approval Ratings Pearson’s r Correlation Test Results 1953-2012 
  Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-Tailed) N 
All Executive Orders1 0.077* 0.04 719 
Salient Executive Orders1 0.132** 0.00 587 
Lagged Presidential 
Approval2 
0.930** 0.00 718 
Stock Market Index3 -0.186** 0.00 719 
Consumer Price Index3 -0.261** 0.00 719 
Each Pearson’s r correlation test is with presidential job approval ratings. ** Correlation is 
significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
1Source: Howell (2005). 2Source: Gallup Survey Data. 3Source: Shiller (2005). 
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Table 7. Presidential Job Approval Ratings and Scandals Pearson’s r Correlation Test 
Results 1953-2012 
  Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-Tailed) N 
Watergate -0.264** 0.000 719 
Iran Contra -0.029 0.435 719 
Each Pearson’s r correlation test is with presidential job approval ratings. ** Correlation is 
significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 8. Average Presidential Approval Ratings and Average Number of Executive Orders Issued by President 1953-
2012 
  Approval Ratings1 Executive Orders2 Salient Executive Orders2 
Presidents N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Eisenhower 95 49 77 64 96 1 12 4.92 96 0 3 0.45 
Kennedy 35 56 79 69.85 35 1 18 6.54 35 0 4 0.63 
Johnson 61 34 78 55 61 1 12 5.11 61 0 3 0.25 
Nixon 67 23 65 49.59 67 0 14 5.3 67 0 3 0.39 
Ford 29 37 70 47.02 29 1 11 5.24 29 0 2 0.21 
Carter 48 29 71 44.65 48 1 19 6.42 48 0 2 0.17 
Reagan 96 36 68 52.72 96 0 9 3.89 96 0 2 0.21 
Bush 48 33 84 59.21 48 0 7 3.33 48 0 1 0.15 
Clinton 97 40 67 54.63 97 0 11 3.73 97 0 1 0.13 
G. W. Bush 96 27 88 49.37 96 0 14 2.96 12 0 2 0.33 
Obama 48 41 65 49.26 48 0 9 3.04         
1Source: Gallup Survey Data. 2Source: Howell (2005) 
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Table 9. Robinson’s Gaussian Semiparametric Estimation Procedure 
Series 
Robinson 
Gaussian 
Semiparametric 
Estimate of d 
H0: 
d=01 
H0:d=11 
Executive Orders2 -0.63 -17 10 
Salient Executive 
Orders2 
-0.81 -20 4.8 
Stock Market Index3 0.08 2.21 29 
Consumer Price 
Index3 
0.22 6.09 33 
Unemployment 0.33 9.1 36 
Military Casualties 
(Afghanistan) 
-0.44 -12 15 
Military Casualties 
(Iraq) 
-0.39 -10 16 
The Surge 0.00 0.00 27 
Desert Storm -0.18 -4.98 22 
9/11 Terrorist Attack -0.57 -15 11 
Watergate -0.03 0.83 26 
Iran-Contra Scandal -0.24 -6.65 21 
Honeymoon -0.2 -5.54 22 
Divided Government -0.01 -0.27 27 
Eisenhower 0.00 0.00 27 
Kennedy 0.00 0.00 27 
Johnson 0.01 0.27 27 
Nixon 0.00 0.00 27 
Ford -0.02 -0.55 27 
Carter -0.01 -0.55 27 
Reagan 0.00 0.00 27 
Bush -0.01 -0.27 27 
Clinton 0.00 0.00 27 
G. W. Bush 0.00 0.00 27 
Obama 0.00 0.00 27 
Presidential 
Approval4 
-0.20 -5.54 22 
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1These are the t-ratios of the null hypothesis that d=0 and d=1 
2Source: Howell (2005). 3Source: Shiller (2005). 4Source: Gallup Survey Data. 
  
89 
 
Table 10. Kwiatkowski et al. (KPSS) Unit Root Test Results 
Series Lag Truncation Parameter (L) 
  L = 0 L=10 L=20 L=28 
Executive Orders1 0.15 0.4 0.39 0.37 
Salient Executive 
Orders1 
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Stock Market Index2 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.09 
Consumer Price 
Index2 
0.31 0.37 0.35 0.32 
Unemployment 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Military Casualties 
(Afghanistan) 
0.74 1.07 0.71 0.61* 
Military Casualties 
(Iraq) 
0.12 0.12 0.09 0.08 
The Surge 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Desert Storm 0 0 0.01 0.02 
9/11 Terrorist Attack 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 
Watergate 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Iran-Contra Scandal 0.05 0.1 0.09 0.09 
Honeymoon 0.32 0.07 0.08 0.09 
Divided Government 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Eisenhower 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 
Kennedy 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Johnson 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Nixon 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Ford 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Carter 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Reagan 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Bush 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Clinton 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
G. W. Bush 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Obama 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
Presidential 
Approval3 
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
1Source: Howell (2005). 2Source: Shiller (2005). 3Source: Gallup Survey Data. 
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Table 11. OLS Regression Estimated Effects on Presidential Job Approval Ratings 1953-
2012 (Model 1) 1953-2002 (Model 2) 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. 
Executive Orders1 0.06 0.06    
Salient Executive 
Orders1   
0.12 0.25 
Stock Market 
Index2 
0.01** 0 .01* 0.008 
Consumer Price 
Index2 
-0.69+ 0.328 -1.80* 0.83 
Unemployment -0.58 0.91 -0.88 0.99 
Military Casualties 
(Afghanistan) 
-0.03+ 0.02 2.13 1.53 
Military Casualties 
(Iraq) 
0.001 0.01    
Surge -1.63 1.62    
Desert Storm 1.56 6.38 2.15 6.82 
Iraq War 0.832 3.67    
9/11 20.61** 0.66 22.56** 1.33 
Watergate -1.65 3.46 -1.67 3.54 
Iran Contra -3.33 2.55 -3.30 2.6 
Honeymoon 0.97 0.991 1.02 1.03 
Divided 
Government 
2.72** 0.58 4.18** 0.58 
Eisenhower -75.11** 7.77 -79.74** 8 
Kennedy -69.26** 6.65 -72.16** 7.02 
Johnson -54.77 5.65 -56.78** 5.94 
Nixon -43.23 4.67 -46.93** 5.01 
Ford 2.14 3.75 -1.3 3.96 
Carter -3.90 2.58 -5.00 2.91 
Reagan 2.06 1.92 -0.51 2.187 
Bush -9.28** 1.17 -11.62** 1.27 
Clinton 5.62** 0.62 5.41** 0.7 
G. W. Bush 2.89** 0.96 3.51** 1.15 
Obama 38.47** 2.03    
Lagged Approval3 0.12 0.07 0.108 0.08 
N 706  585   
Adj. R-Squared 0.27  0.23   
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Standard error of 
the estimate 
4.28 
 
4.43   
Durbin H -0.06H   0.401   
+, significant at 10%; *, significant at 5%; **, significant at 1%, all 2-tailed. Hnon-significant 
therefore no serial autocorrelation is present. Coefficients are unstandardized. 1Source: Howell 
(2005). 2Source: Shiller (2005). 3Source: Gallup Survey Data. 
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Table 12. Individual-Level Data Descriptive Statistics 1980-2012 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Presidential Approval 30212 0 1 0.55 
Executive Orders 31529 31 82 45.62 
Salient Executive 
Orders 20570 0 5 2.31 
Party ID 31254 1 7 3.96 
Age 31529 0 99 45.29 
Education 31207 1 4 2.65 
Gender 31529 0 1 0.54 
Social Class 23828 0 7 2.99 
Caucasian 31316 0 1 0.76 
African American 31316 0 1 0.12 
Hispanic 31316 0 1 0.09 
Internal Efficacy 18044 0 1 0.29 
External Efficacy 24674 1 5 2.82 
Perception of the 
Economy (Past) 30929 -1 1 -0.24 
Perception of the 
Economy (Future) 27411 -1 1 0.08 
President’s Party ID 31529 0 1 0.55 
Divided Government 31529 0 1 0.85 
Executive orders data obtained from Howell (2005). All other data obtained from The American 
National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File 1948-2012.  
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Table 13. The Type of Government (Unified or Divided), Number of Respondents, and 
Number of Executive Orders Issued, in Each Survey Year (1980-2012) 
Year Frequency 
Executive 
Orders 
Salient 
Executive 
Orders 
Type of 
Government 
1980 1614 82 4 Unified 
1982 1418 65 4 Divided 
1984 2257 49 1 Divided 
1986 2176 36 5 Divided 
1988 2040 46 1 Divided 
1990 1980 43 1 Divided 
1992 2488 52 2 Divided 
1994 1795 46 5 Unified 
1996 1714 50 1 Divided 
1998 1281 41 2 Divided 
2000 1807 36 0 Divided 
2002 1511 52  Divided 
2004 1212 42  Unified 
2008 2322 31  Divided 
2012 5914 43  Divided 
Total 31529 714 26   
Executive orders data obtained from Howell (2005). All other data obtained from The American 
National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File 1948-2012. 
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Table 14. Mean Comparison Analysis of Presidential Job Approval Ratings and Executive 
Orders 1980-2012 
Executive 
Orders Mean 
31 0.2723 
36 0.6546 
41 0.748 
42 0.4563 
43 0.5431 
46 0.5623 
49 0.6337 
50 0.6801 
52 0.7186 
65 0.5136 
82 0.4081 
Total 0.552 
Executive orders data obtained from Howell (2005). Presidential approval data obtained from 
The American National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File 1948-2012. 
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Table 15. Mean Comparison Analysis of Salient Executive Orders and Presidential 
Approval Ratings 1980-2002 
Salient 
Executive 
Orders Mean 
0 0.6715 
1 0.639 
2 0.5384 
4 0.458 
5 0.5869 
Total 0.5872 
Executive orders data obtained from Howell (2005). Presidential approval data obtained from 
The American National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File 1948-2012. 
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Table 16. Mean Comparison Analysis of Party ID and Presidential Approval Ratings 
(1980-2012) 
Party ID Mean 
Strong Opposite 0.1705 
Mild Opposite 0.3829 
Weak Opposite 0.294 
Neutral (Independent) 0.5441 
Weak Same 0.7761 
Mild Same 0.7907 
Strong Same 0.9203 
Total 0.5519 
Data obtained from The American National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative 
Data File 1948-2012. 
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Table 17. Mean Comparison Analyses of Past Performance of the Economy and 
Presidential Approval Ratings, and Future Performance of the Economy and Presidential 
Approval Ratings 1980-2012 
  
Past Performance of the 
Economy 
Future Performance of the 
Economy 
  Mean Mean 
Worse 0.3728 0.4099 
Stay(ed) the same 0.6207 0.5411 
Better 0.8226 0.686 
Total 0.5512 0.5558 
Data obtained from The American National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative 
Data File 1948-2012. 
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Table 18. Mean Comparison Analysis of Divided Government and Presidential Approval 
Ratings 1980-2012 
Divided 
Government Mean 
Unified 0.4796 
Divided 0.5642 
Total 0.552 
Data obtained from The American National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative 
Data File 1948-2012. 
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Table 19. Mean Comparison Analysis of Gender and Presidential Approval Ratings 1980-
2012 
President Party ID 
Respondent 
Gender Mean N 
Democrat Male 0.5321 6338 
  Female 0.5903 7267 
  Total 0.5632 13606 
Republican Male 0.5701 7545 
  Female 0.5201 9061 
  Total 0.5428 16607 
Total Male 0.5528 13883 
  Female 0.5513 16329 
  Total 0.552 30212 
Data obtained from The American National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative 
Data File 1948-2012. 
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Table 20. Logistic Regression Estimated Effects on Presidential Job Approval Ratings 
1980-2012 (Model 1) 1980-2002 (Model 2) 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B S.E. Sig. VIF B S.E. Sig. VIF 
Executive Orders1 0 0 0.94 1.92      
Salient Executive Orders      -0.182 0.02 0 1.47 
Party ID1 0.589 0.01 0 1.1 0.536 0.01 0 1.07 
EO*Party ID1 -0.003 0 0 1.04      
Age -0.004 0 0 1.1 -0.004 0 0.01 1.1 
Education -0.148 0.03 0 1.35 -0.127 0.03 0 1.36 
Gender 0.164 0.07 0.01 2.19 0.212 0.08 0.01 2.78 
Social Class -0.007 0.01 0.61 1.26 0.009 0.02 0.55 1.25 
White -0.045 0.13 0.73 6.08 -0.056 0.15 0.72 7 
Black -0.026 0.14 0.86 4.34 -0.251 0.17 0.13 5.09 
Hispanic 0.157 0.15 0.29 3.31 0.111 0.18 0.53 3.55 
Internal Efficacy -0.272 0.05 0 1.17 -0.261 0.06 0 1.18 
External Efficacy 0.092 0.02 0 1.19 0.063 0.02 0 1.17 
Economic Perception 
0.849 0.03 0 1.25 0.69 0.03 0 1.19 
of the Economy (Past) 
Economic Perception 
0.12 0.03 0 1.15 0.114 0.03 0 1.12 
of the Economy (Future) 
President’s Party ID 0.751 0.07 0 2.75 0.522 0.08 0 2.65 
Divided Government 0.24 0.09 0.01 2.4      
Gender*President’s Party 
ID 
-0.269 0.09 0 3.36 -0.321 0.1 0 3.94 
Constant 0.324 0.17 0.06   -1.139 0.2 0   
Cox & Snell R Square 0.321     0.278     
Nagelkerke R-Square 0.428     0.373     
Percentage of Cases 
Correctly Classified 
76.50% 
  
  74.80% 
  
  
Cases Included in 
Analysis 
12967 
  
  10273 
  
  
Missing Cases 18559     21253     
Total Cases 31526       31526       
1 This variable is mean centered in Model 1. 
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Executive orders data obtained from Howell (2005). All other data obtained from The American 
National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File 1948-2012.  
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Table 21. Predicted Probability of Approving of the President When Executive Orders and 
Party ID Vary (Model 1) 1980-2012 
Executive 
Orders1 
Party ID (-3 
“Strong 
Opposite”) 
Party ID (0 
“Independent”) 
Party ID (3 
“Strong 
Same”) 
-14.63 0.293 0.7346 0.9487 
-9.63 0.3025 0.7346 0.9464 
-4.63 0.312 0.7346 0.9441 
-3.63 0.314 0.7346 0.9436 
-2.63 0.3159 0.7346 0.9431 
0.37 0.3218 0.7346 0.9417 
3.37 0.3277 0.7346 0.9402 
4.37 0.3297 0.7346 0.9397 
6.37 0.3337 0.7346 0.9386 
19.37 0.3602 0.7346 0.9315 
36.37 0.3961 0.7346 0.9211 
Total 0.3214 0.7346 0.9416 
1 In Model 1 Executive Orders and Party ID are mean centered. The actual mean should be 0.00 
instead of 0.37 (0.37 is the result of a rounding error when subtracting the mean from Executive 
Orders in SPSS). 
All other interval-level variables were held at their mean. Ordinal-level variables were held at 
their median value, and nominal-level variables were held at their modal value. 
Executive orders data obtained from Howell (2005). All other data obtained from The American 
National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File 1948-2012. 
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Table 22. Predicted Probability of Approving of the President When Salient Executive 
Orders and Party ID Vary (Model 2) 1980-2002 
Salient Executive 
Orders 
Party ID (1 "Strong 
Opposite") 
Party ID (4 
"Independent") 
Party ID (7 "Strong 
Same") 
0 0.3932 0.7639 0.9417 
1 0.3507 0.7295 0.9309 
2 0.3105 0.6921 0.9182 
4 0.2383 0.6097 0.8864 
5 0.2069 0.5656 0.8667 
Average 0.3027 0.6764 0.9105 
All other interval-level variables were held at their mean. Ordinal-level variables were held at 
their median value, and nominal-level variables were held at their modal value. 
Executive orders data obtained from Howell (2005). All other data obtained from The American 
National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File 1948-2012. 
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Table 23. Predicted Probability of Approving of the President by Gender and the 
President's Party Affiliation (Model 1) 1980-2012 
President Partisan 
Identity Female Male 
Democrat 0.63 0.59 
Republic 0.73 0.75 
Total 0.69 0.68 
All other interval-level variables were held at their mean. Ordinal-level variables were held at 
their median value, and nominal-level variables were held at their modal value. 
Data obtained from The American National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative 
Data File 1948-2012. 
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